"The Ultimate Social Contract?"

Towards the end of our session yesterday evening, a question was raised regarding the possibility of a single unified government to lead all the people on Earth.  Frankly, the thought of a global government does not sit well with me.  I’m not talking about organizations like the United Nations or the International Criminal Courts, or any of the international platforms discussed in our first group presentations.  I’m referring to the idea of one governmental body ruling the entire planet, a complete organized unification of the countries and cultures we know today.  While Hobbes would probably flip somersaults at this ultimate culmination of his Contract Theory, I want to offer my personal cautions in fighting for such a unipolar world.

In order for the contract to work at such a high echelon, there must be a threat greater than anything we know in the present world, a threat so imminent and dangerous that it threatens the most basic way of life (ie – aliens, as Professor Shirk so suggested), encouraging us to join together and give our covenant to a defined leader or group of leaders.  From my window of the world, I don’t see people uniting against such a threat anytime soon, certainly not in my lifetime.  Additionally, our world is currently so divided any total unity seems like an unrealistic dream. 

Even if some sort of global “peace” and unity was to be achieved I highly doubt it would last very long.  Historical examples that come close could include Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, and Great Britain (back in their heyday, of course).  They ruled such large portions of the world, but as soon as certain leaders died, the power structure immediately shifted and changed.  In my humble opinion, Hobbes’s Social Contract works better at relatively smaller levels.  It may not eradicate all conflict, but it’s more realistic.

Side note: Speaking of aliens, Hollywood didn’t do such a bad job in playing out a similar scenario when they created the masterpiece Independence Day.  I’m just saying.

Coercion and Reason Part II

Coercion and Reason Part II

A Relationship Defined by Replacement or Coordination?

     As the title suggests, this post is a continuation of last week's entry. While I think I got most of my ideas on the subject across last week, there are a few subjects I'd like to touch upon based on the group presentations we recently built as a class.

     The groups analyzed several international agreements and organizations, including the UNSC, the WTO, the BWC and the Basel Convention. As the groups tried to find an answer to the question of whether or not their subject successfully replaces coercion with reason, I noticed a couple of patterns in the histories of these organizations/conventions.

     The first pattern involves 'successful' organizations. Namely the WTO and to a certain extent, the UNSC. By and large these two organizations see progress in using reason over coercion by comparison to most other international organizations or agreements. There is, however, a critical factor that stands out with both organizations. While both bodies strive for the use of reason as opposed to turning to coercion, the threat of coercive force is ever-present as both organizations have the ability to utilize force (economic and in the case of the UNSC, physical as well) in the event that reason fails.

     The second pattern involves the more unsuccessful agreements. In the case of the Basel Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), both agreements have histories of being violated or undermined by weak and powerful nations alike. Further, both the Basel Convention and the BWC suffer from a lack of credible enforcement and must rely on good will and the spirit of the agreements to pressure compliance. This is in addition to public shaming, which in and of itself may be considered a weaker form of coercion (though effective against weak or democratic states due to the importance of public opinion). To this end, while both agreements aim to use reason to generate progress, they fail in doing this due to an inherent lack of progress. This lack of progress is likely caused by the absence of an effective form of enforcement. Nevertheless, such soft-law agreements, in my opinion, are excellent stepping stones towards hard-law agreements that have a greater ability to apply reason because of their ability to be credibly enforced through coercion.

     In summary, I would suggest that we should not look at the relationship of reason and coercion as one of mutual exclusivity. Instead, they are interdependent. Coercion without reason leads, ultimately, to oppression or annihilation. Reason without coercion leads to a lack of progress, violation, and in the worst of cases, unilateral coercive action that undermines the strength of the international organization or agreement. It seems to me that the concept of the carrot and stick remains a golden rule. In line with one of my classmate's comments in last week's lecture, it appears that Teddy Roosevelt's quote, "Speak softly and carry a big stick", still applies to the modern international order.

Hobbes and Security

  Through much of Leviathan, Hobbes' primary concern is with the security of the state, and the function of Sovereigns, above all else, is to provide security to subjects.  Interestingly, Leviathan is not as concerned with external threats to security so much as internal, dealing with threats to the public peace which may arise in sufficient discord to topple a government - particularly relevant for Hobbes, as he was writing during the turmoil and aftermath of a series of civil wars within England pertaining to the nature of government and fundamental rights of the King.  To protect against such bloody conflicts (which Hobbes likens to his own conceptualization of the state of nature), he insists upon the necessity of a strong Sovereign body established by covenant (social contract) amongst a society.

  For Hobbes, a Sovereign established by force is just as valid is one established by common agreement: in both cases, he argues that consent is present - in the case of force, the subjected peoples' not rising up against the new sovereign is taken as a signal of consent to rule being given to the sovereign by social contract.  Hobbes argues that this is a valid arrangement because restraints placed upon individuals by the Sovereign's laws are only artificial and may be disobeyed if desired, even if such actions would invoke a Sovereign's right to punish criminals and/or to censor dissent, having infringed upon the Sovereign's ability to promote peace and security within the state.  Hobbes differs this form of coercive government to the relationship by master and slave by claiming that no physical restraint prevents subjects from acting, so they retain their freedom in that their only restraints are those they tacitly agree to place upon themselves.  Though this argument is elegant, it seems to ignore the existence of gunpowder, ropes, and axes as the instruments of the Sovereign's will, separating consequences and punishment restraining factors with a rhetorical trick - slavery isn't denoted only through physical restraint, but fear of punishment or retribution is a unifying factor of subservience that is present among all practiced forms of slavery and here is one of the primary tools of Sovereigns in maintaining their authority.

  Here, we begin to arrive at a totalitarian conceptualization of sovereignty.  Fear and ability to do violence are the sovereign's tools in keeping their own authority, which is only granted to them by the society's members agreement to restrain themselves in certain capacities to promote the peace.  However, Hobbes maintains that the Sovereign has its own rights in pursuing the protection of that peace among his subjects to effectively render any restraints done by subjects meaningless.  In Chapter 18, when Hobbes begins to detail the rights of Sovereigns, it is noted that neither Sovereign nor Subject has the right to free themselves from the obligations of the contract (Hobbes, p. 97).   Under Hobbes conception, dissenters should yield to the majority if said majority is in support of the sovereign formed by compact, yet dissenters are not given any reflexive powers to abdicate their own portion of the contract, having provided consent to the Sovereign's rule when they bowed out to allow the contract to take form.  While Hobbes goes on to allot the powers of censorship of dissent to the Sovereign in an attempt to cover-up this weakness (Hobbes, p. 101), citing the old maxim "A kingdom divided among itself cannot stand."  In particular, this allotment of power seems contradictory to Hobbes' establishment of right to rule by contract - the value of consent is lost when the Sovereign begins to quash dissenters' complaints, creating a situation where subjects fear voicing objections to the Sovereign, and while Hobbes is mainly concerned with monarchies, seems completely at-odds with modern conceptualizations of democracies.  Yet, quashing dissent doesn't necessarily make dissenting voices become silent, and in silencing that dissent governments can find themselves creating more dissent concerning the methods employed - if these rights have been ordained to the Sovereign in order to procure security against civil wars breaking out, it's unclear by what mechanism they will actually be prevented.

Hobbes's break from the ancients allowed him to pioneer modern social science

#1 Hobbes, Leviathan

Andrew Utman

Thomas Hobbes laid the foundation for the “realist” school of international relations in his assertions that men are motivated by fear to form social convenants, and imbue such convenants with the force of law, backed by the use of coercive force, violent and lethal if necessary. He denies there is any such Universal Truth, and neither also any Universal Morality, except that which he establishes by axiomatic reduction depending on his definitions. 

This precludes the possibility of the validity of positive motives for forming a government, and reduces them exclusively, or at least primarily and fundamentally, to the “negative” state which exists to prevent outcomes, rather than assure or create outcomes, except insofar as physical safety and the integrity of one’s property is a positive attribute. Hobbes however prefers instead to lean heavily on fear and fear’s power to compel people to entrust their safety in a sovereign, instead of in themselves, and to further contract with that sovereign power to do various other things for them, all of which, apparently are protective and driven by fear. 

This would imply men who have no fear, have no need of government, and such things as men value that do not depend on fear cannot or should not be entrusted to a government. Such men would therefore, if they had personal ethics, philosophical values or religious morality that they wished to further, would have to do so entirely privately, unless such great numbers of them feared something in relation to their own collective secular or religious code that they would seek to empower their government to act to prevent against it. So even here, by logical extension, the possibility of “idealism” in foreign policy is also created, although Hobbes himself actively inveighs against it.

Hobbes’ own amorality directly contradicts the aspirations of an idealist foreign policy which would seek to establish good in other lands for the sake of human rights and to alleviate suffering. Hobbesian analysis would be much more realist in that it would directly question the value of any such ventures unless they could be shown to have instrumental, or paradigm reinforcing power, rather than merely moral value, which he clearly denigrates. 

Vladimir Putin seems entirely comfortable with Hobbesian ideas and seems to view his own state as Machiavelli would have, whether it is better to be feared, than loved, if you must choose, and that any action done against sovereign states is a threat to the entire state-based system, hence the need to intervene in Syria to prop up Assad, although that line can also be seen as a self-serving pretext for intervention in the region where larger geopolitical competition is ongoing.

It is Hobbes’ own view of the non-existence of an essence, soul, or its special metaphysical value that seems most at odds with the traditions and morals of the mid-17th century, and well into the present, since a majority of people either believe in a God in some form, or subscribe to one of the world’s majority religious faiths or paths. So, it seems the majority of people’s own sensibilities and beliefs contradict Hobbes amoral assertions of no heaven or hell, and God’s own existence as hypothetical and essentially irrelevant. While I’m personally comfortable with this assertions, many millions around the world, including Westerners, and secular Humanists, would be appalled or at least take issue with such positions. The viability of such a theory of moral and political philosophy might be imperiled or at least limited by such anti- traditional, amoral pronouncements, all the more so in the mid-17th century.

However, Hobbes contribution has definitely stayed, and its legacy endured as it laid ground for thinking about the primacy of ideas about man coming out of a state of nature, through a state of war, into the formation of an organized, political state, or commonwealth. He even presupposes the concept of an artificial man that became a concept foundational to the modern rule of law based on the power and sovereignty of the state. Hobbes’ ideas about the role of consent and the acquisition of power have certainly been challenged by modern ideas about free agency, duress, dissolvability, and the requirements of the state to fulfill a full range of positive, and not only negative functions including but not limited to protection. 

Notwithstanding these evolutions and challenges to Hobbesianism, the Leviathan directly challenges Plato’s idea of the ideal city in the Republic based on the three types of souls men are supposed to have, as well as Aristotle’s perfect city of the Politics where men pursuing the highest goods of life through contemplation naturally rule by virtue of their superior reason, intellect and wisdom. Hobbes instead forces us to consider even more basic reasons for which men organize a government and why they should have allegiance to it, without references to any allegory of the cave, or Platonic Forms-based hierarchies of men and their activities according to relative degrees of perfection. In doing so, Hobbes brings political philosophy out of the territory of metaphysicists, mystics and moralizing traditionalists, and places it alongside natural sciences, thus freeing it to involve into social science. 

Two Sides of the Same Coin

Two Sides of the Same Coin

Hobbes' Leviathan and the Relationship Between Realist and Liberal Worldviews

     It seems that at the beginning of every course on international relations, we are asked to sum up our beliefs about world order and bin ourselves into a category of thought. The two most popular of which, if anything because of their seemingly melodramatic relationship, are the categories of Realists and Liberals. Those who believe in the ultimate power of coercion versus those that believe in the might of reason and world order. At the beginning of any one semester, or other period of instruction,  it seems there is no ground for compromise. I remember, very distinctly, in my first ever class on international relations at Boston University the teacher's assistance asked us to physically move and sit in sides of the room corresponding to our respective categories. I sat in the middle and was consequently lectured on how I needed to choose. When I retorted, I was asked what my worldview was. The response was a request for me to sit on the physical-'right' side of the room, aka, the realists' corner. I did so only in protest.

     Many scholars, and would-be scholars (students and the general public), frequently argue that Hobbes' treatise on the state and world order fit decisively into one train (or trayne, as it has been this weekend) or category of thought or another. For this initial post, I want to take a look at this perception (largely described in Part I or the Leviathan), and my disagreement with it.

     One of the primary concerns or complaints with Hobbes' work is that it takes an awfully long time to get to the point, i.e. discussion of the State. In truth, it is for good reason. Much like a 21st century student reading 17th century English for the first time, many of Hobbes' contemporaries would have found his work difficult to digest. This is not because they were not well versed his English, but because they were not so well educated in the art of governance or, frankly, as well educated in general, by and large, as the public is today (speaking in relative terms, of course). For this reason, the emphasis that Hobbes' places on imagery in Part I of Leviathan is incredibly important because it acts as a sort of Rosetta Stone that translates the everyday knowledge of the reader (about basic sciences and their body) into Hobbes' main ideas, which are more complex. This stepping stone acts as a transition and allows the concepts he describes in later chapters to be more easily digestible by his audience. In this this respect, it was a brilliant use of the English language.

     Through this imagery, in the Preface and Part I of the Leviathan Hobbes' breaks down the fundamental forces (laws) of nature as he sees them. In this respect, I can say I broadly agree with his point of view. From his initial steps into the shallow-end of the intellectual pool, explaining how human beings make decisions, to his acknowledgement that productive external discourse can only occur when the basic definitions (facts) can be agreed upon prior to debate Hobbes makes points which are difficult to disagree with. Hundreds of years after Hobbes, even NASA agrees with his basic principle that math is the universal language of life. When the Voyager II spacecraft was sent into space, the instruction manual for the on-board golden record, as well as the diagram denoting the location of our solar system, were both written in what essentially amounts to mathematics. In any case, Hobbes describes a world that lives in a general state of anarchy (the state of nature). Here is where the controversy springs... he denotes that there are three possible outcomes for an anarchic world: submission to the judgement of the Arbitrator (which is later the Sovereign), conflict, or perpetual disagreement. Realists cling to the point about conflict, liberals cling to the mention of reason and the judgement of a higher power.

     My point of view is that conflict and arbitration (i.e. binding authority of international organizations, in the international relations sense of this discussion) are two sides of the same coin and both are legitimate means of escaping the state of nature that Hobbes describes. Where I disagree with Hobbes his apparent suggestion that reason is permanent and coercive superiority is not. Throughout history we have seen that both are temporary. With regards to a monopoly on coercive force, this is why Pax Romana and Pax Britannica did not last. It is why Pax Americana will not live on perpetually. Turning to reason, because of the very nature of dissolving imagination, memory, etc. (recollection of the lessons of the past!) that Hobbes describes in at length in Part I, human perceptions of reason are evolutionary and so an agreement on definitions (facts) will never live on in unchanging perpetuity. In an ideal world? Yes. However, as Courtney touches on in her post, we do not live in an ideal world and future generations may not agree with our version of the social contract (per our version of reason, dictated by our definitions) This is so because of our humanity, because we do not think, speak and convey complex ideas of governance solely in geometry or other forms of math as Hobbes envisions.

     Hobbes acknowledges that both coercion and reason (arbitration) are means of escaping the state of nature. Consequently the realists are not wrong is suggesting that Hobbes states this, but they are only looking at one part of a greater point that he attempts to make, and thus miss his conclusion. Further, Liberals believe they see the greater point, and in a sense they do, but Hobbes' point in and of itself, as he presents it, presumes an ideal world where perpetual reason can be achieved and enforced indefinitely. Admittedly, Hobbes was a man ahead of his time (and if a Utopian future based on incontrovertible reason is attainable, he may still be). Unfortunately his point (and the Liberal school of thought) is flawed as human reason does not live in a vacuum. In the end, the Leviathan is a peaceful escape from the state of nature that allows for the resolution of conflicts through arbitration, however it must maintain a reasonable monopoly on force in order to enforce its will. When either the monopoly on force or the reason upon which the Leviathan is built begins to decay, so too does the Leviathan itself and the society it represents. We then return to a state of nature until a new monopoly is established, either through reason, or through coercive power alone. As such, Realist and Liberal worldviews are not mutually exclusive, they are two sides of the coin and jointly, the solution to the puzzle that is the state of nature and the anarchy of the human experience.

Hobbes' and Paradox

From its title to its conclusion Hobbes’ Leviathan presents paradox at once founded in fear and in courage.  It appears the work of a man with a “truth” to tell based on the former and a tentative approach to presenting it based on the latter – more than a bit of preemptive spin.  Hobbes is prescient to an extent, and but trapped, despite efforts to escape through arguments for alternative sovereignties, in a monarchical model of governance. By all accounts – and his own in Leviathan -  he sought and relished deductive reasoning, but the writing fails there, at times almost coming across as a game with the reader.  While academic discussion appears strewn with thoughts on Hobbes’ own views, how can those accurately be discerned in relation to religion or even his preference for one type of sovereign over another?  How much of his argument is a gamble on future states of affairs?  How much is strategy to preserve, not only his person in the short term, but the integrity of what he hoped to convey and infuse into social and political discourse over the long term? How much is veiled?  As it seems unlikely Hobbes was blind to the inconsistencies in his statements and style, one can imagine a man struggling with the degree to which he might safely make statements akin to others that had ended badly for his contemporaries in scientific and political arenas.  There seems a new dance with each discussion in turn, on language, on the natural condition of man, on Hobbes’ solution in sovereignty, and on how this are compatible with Christianity. 

In the context of the times, beginning with his birth coinciding with news of the Spanish Armada and the necessity of his flight to France in anticipation of the demise of Charles I, Hobbes’ world was bound in change and challenge. His brilliance leading him from the life of a commoner to that involving rubbing shoulders with aristocracy, royalty and the greatest thinkers of the day, would also have made him privy to events in the world around him – and the dangers lurking therein.  Galileo’s execution for heresy in 1642 must certainly have rattled him. Yet Hobbes expounds on his own philosophy first articulated in De Cive, that very year, by training scrutiny on himself in his metaphorical reference to “Leviathan,” a biblical monster separated from its male counterpart, “Behemoth” by God to prevent their proliferation, as the thing for which man should strive (Job 40:15-34).  Though it may not have turned heads quite so profoundly without the shock effect produced in conjuring an image of power in something distinctly singled out for destruction by God, his case for sovereignty, using the precise “Definitions” for which he advocates in his discussion of language, could as readily have been presented using the drier strategy.

Hobbes conception of all things, including “Sense,” “Imagination,” and “Trayne of Imaginations,” and their subsequent development into language, reason, and science, emanating from the matter and motion relies on the deductive reasoning of geometry to convey its irrefutable nature.  It even conjures, to some degree, an image of neurological dynamics emerging in our own day. But, the premise of the argument does not meet his own standard for rigor.  He is builds a house of cards by creating a foundation reliant on philosophical agreement that did not exist at the time.  It subjects him to easy critique by his contemporaries.

On that note, I confess to not budgeting time sufficiently to finish what I started and so will have subject myself to criticism from my own peers and professor by pausing this blog before providing tangible evidence supporting my initial statements or concluding statements tying it all together.   I am in awe of an individual who so successfully and against all odds, altered political discourse, but am left with a thousand questions.   

References:

Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (Norton Critical Edition), New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996.

Smith, Steven. “The Sovereign State: Hobbes’ Leviathan.” 2008. Lecture presented 9/22/2008 at Yale University. Accessed September 5, 2016 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3S1uqgGfB4>

Week 1_Coercion or Reason_Parker

First, I would just like to say that it’s been more than four years since I’ve read such antiquated writing, and yes I consider 400 years old to be antiquated, it’s practically a foreign language when you think about the progression of spelling, grammar, and other mechanical aspects of literature.  I found that reading the text aloud greatly contributed to my ability to interpret and digest the text.

Part one could possibly be one of the inspirations for the lyrics of Gilbert and Sullivan’s “The Modern Major-General Song”(please enjoy the video if you don't know what this is!).  While initially perusing the topics to be covered in the section, I couldn’t’ help but draw a correlation between the variety and depth of subjects and the Major-General’s claim to a highly educated and well rounded persona; it was also highly amusing to imagine Hobbes parading around a stage in the Pirates of Penzance and singing about Contract Theory. Hobbes writes widely on an assortment of topics that seemed irrelevant to the overall purpose of the book at first; but, after trudging through all 16 chapters, I believe his intent was to lay a foundation.  I have learned over the years that writing, good writing, always develops a foundation or framework before attempting to dive into the depths.  Hobbes was trying to make sure that his readers understood definitions and relationships prior to his doctrinal claims so as to avoid potential confusion and/or misconstruction of his work.

Part Two is what I refer to as the “meat and potatoes” of the writing.  Hobbes starts to break down his developed doctrine of Social Contract Theory in a methodical and painfully detailed manner.  What I liked most in Part Two is Hobbes’s analogy of the ants and bees in Chapter 17.  Why can’t man live in harmony like the ants and the bees?  A simple question with a six-part answer that is simpler in statement than in comprehension.  In particular, reasons three and four stood out to me: men think themselves wiser and more able to govern the public than the rest; and men can use words to represent good as evil and evil as good.  Both of these explanations stuck out to me in light of current issues and events facing our nation today, most notably the Presidential Election Campaign.  With the way I have seen this campaign played out, it is easy to see why we, as humans, cannot live in easy harmony like the ants and the bees.

Personally, the overarching tenets of Social Contract Theory make sense to me.  I can see elements of his doctrinal beliefs played out in a multitude of events, events that occurred after Hobbes’s lifetime, which to me is pretty cool.  And I agree that man tends to be more selfish and quarrelsome than kind hearted and peaceful.  While, ultimately, Hobbes’s did have an influence on American governmental development, I am glad that Contract Theory in whole was not used.  I quite like the system put in place by our Founding Fathers.

One question that I’ve though about while reading regards the succession of the will of the people.  If a group of people come together and decide to form a contract of sovereignty with an individual or group of persons, that’s great.  But what happens when their children grow up and none of them like the current contract?  Hobbes’s appears, to me at least anyways, to say “too bad, so sad”.  The contract, according to Hobbes, is unbreakable unless circumstances meet certain requirements.  If the people (grown up children in this case) decide they no longer support the contract agreed to by their parents, they have no “legal” recourse.  This seems harsh and unfair to those children who were born into existing contract societies.  While, as an American, I am by no means complaining about being born into my “contract society”, but I’m sure people exist who do.