Monday, September 12, 2016

Coercion and Reason Part II


Coercion and Reason Part II
A Relationship Defined by Replacement or Coordination?

     As the title suggests, this post is a continuation of last week's entry. While I think I got most of my ideas on the subject across last week, there are a few subjects I'd like to touch upon based on the group presentations we recently built as a class.

     The groups analyzed several international agreements and organizations, including the UNSC, the WTO, the BWC and the Basel Convention. As the groups tried to find an answer to the question of whether or not their subject successfully replaces coercion with reason, I noticed a couple of patterns in the histories of these organizations/conventions.

     The first pattern involves 'successful' organizations. Namely the WTO and to a certain extent, the UNSC. By and large these two organizations see progress in using reason over coercion by comparison to most other international organizations or agreements. There is, however, a critical factor that stands out with both organizations. While both bodies strive for the use of reason as opposed to turning to coercion, the threat of coercive force is ever-present as both organizations have the ability to utilize force (economic and in the case of the UNSC, physical as well) in the event that reason fails.

     The second pattern involves the more unsuccessful agreements. In the case of the Basel Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), both agreements have histories of being violated or undermined by weak and powerful nations alike. Further, both the Basel Convention and the BWC suffer from a lack of credible enforcement and must rely on good will and the spirit of the agreements to pressure compliance. This is in addition to public shaming, which in and of itself may be considered a weaker form of coercion (though effective against weak or democratic states due to the importance of public opinion). To this end, while both agreements aim to use reason to generate progress, they fail in doing this due to an inherent lack of progress. This lack of progress is likely caused by the absence of an effective form of enforcement. Nevertheless, such soft-law agreements, in my opinion, are excellent stepping stones towards hard-law agreements that have a greater ability to apply reason because of their ability to be credibly enforced through coercion.

     In summary, I would suggest that we should not look at the relationship of reason and coercion as one of mutual exclusivity. Instead, they are interdependent. Coercion without reason leads, ultimately, to oppression or annihilation. Reason without coercion leads to a lack of progress, violation, and in the worst of cases, unilateral coercive action that undermines the strength of the international organization or agreement. It seems to me that the concept of the carrot and stick remains a golden rule. In line with one of my classmate's comments in last week's lecture, it appears that Teddy Roosevelt's quote, "Speak softly and carry a big stick", still applies to the modern international order.

1 comment:

  1. I wanted to chime in here, and say that this was really well-stated.

    I agree 100% on the idea that while use of reason should always be the ultimate goal, coercion is yet required as a reflex to defend against "bad" actors that either refuse to cooperate on some issue or outright renege on previous agreements.

    Obviously, this idea is reflected in the structures of a lot of the organizations we looked at this week (minus the Basel Convention), and I think that the coercion applied as a final option has a lot to do with the successes of these organizations when compared to the outcomes of organizations that lack coercive measures with true impact (lookin' at you, Basel).

    There definitely has to be some interplay between the two ideals.

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