Week 14 (Belated) Post: Rise and Fall of Great Powers Post-Empire

Rise and Fall of Great Powers Post-Empire

How does the lack of colonies affect the rise and fall of Great Powers?

     It is very well known that some of the most dangerous times in human history have been at the crossroads between the rise of a new great power, and the fall of an old one. Given this, the title and sub-title are an initiation into the question I am seeking to answer here: in an era where the world's great powers are no longer global empires with colonial holdings, what will the 'fall' of a great power look like? The rise? These are important questions to examine because in doing so we gain insights into the world around us. Knowing more about these questions may enable us to identify such actions as the rise and fall of great powers sooner rather than later, potentially preventing calamity.

     Insofar as the rise of a great power is concerned, I think the example of China is critical to our understanding of such dynamics in the 21st century. This may be a bit of a simplistic take on the rise of great powers (and admittedly, the blog format has something to do with that - brevity is key here!), but my personal view is that we will see a similar pattern (like China's) in future great powers. Rapidly industrializing nations with large populations, size-able territories and stable governments will form the mold for future great powers. Presuming that the UN-model of world governance holds, the difference between this pattern and that of older great powers is that the martial path to great power status is not the stepping stone to success. As a result, smaller nations with relatively large militaries will likely not advance to great power status through conquest, but instead those following an economic model have a much greater probability of achieving prosperity, so long as their houses are kept in order (read: governments).

     The fall of great powers is much more complicated. Taking another broad-stroke approach to this analysis while looking generically at the future model of great powers (specifically avoiding too much focus on a US-centric analysis), economics and domestic political instability stand as the most likely culprits in the fall (or otherwise, the suppression of emergent) great powers. Two important examples are Russia and Brazil. Both nations appear to hold the necessary keys to great power status - so much so that they were long heralded as emerging superpowers - but unfortunately both have fallen short. Russia's economic model limits it greatly, creating an almost Soviet-like hollow state that may appear strong, but is in fact greatly limited (in this case, due to Russia's dependence on its energy sector). The Brazilian case is different, but with similar results. Political corruption and the associated instability caused by scandal have, in addition to economic mismanagement, led to a dashing of any hopes that Brazil will emerge as a true great power any time soon. It is rather telling then that Europe, China and other states guard themselves so jealously against such factors.