Week 3: Interests and Ideas

There's a train of thought running through Kirstin and Dan's blogs for this week that I'd like to pick up and expand a little more upon.

Kirstin begins by questioning why ideas have yet to be tied systematically studied in connection to the actions taken by states in the international system, and if our focus on metaphorical/rhetorical discourse is actually doing a disservice to the field in that it doesn't seem entirely connected to the actions of states in the real world, at least directly.

Dan solves this problem to an extent by arguing that interests and ideas aren't necessarily mutually exclusive and that, rather, should probably be understood as being intertwined.  I think that this understanding of the two is probably the most instructive out of what I've seen from Prof Jackson's lecture for this week and the readings, but wanted to expand a bit more as to why I think it works so well.

I'm not necessarily certain that in the present day, that states are able to act on either idea or interest alone.  Rather, I'm convinced that even when it appears an actor is acting according to one train of thought that there's probably some amount of the other underlying that serves to reinforce the decision.  Here, Prof. Jackson's example about McDonald's switch from styrofoam containers appears to be relevant - there's no reason why both the idea that McDonald's decided it wanted to be (more) environmentally friendly and that the switch was simply a cynical ploy to increase sales can't simultaneously be true, and in this case, I tend to believe the latter, but this cynical calculation is yet derived from the commonly-held (though rarely acted upon) belief that protecting the environment is the right thing to do and preys upon that idea even if only to make money for the corporation - the outcome is the same, however, McDonald's became more environmentally friendly.

But we can see this when viewing nations as international actors as well; the US' engagements with Saddam Hussein during the 90's and early 2000's (the Bush Wars?) are pretty good examples.  In both cases, the public rhetoric explaining US intervention was based more in political/social norms and ideas; for the former, that we needed to protect our allies; and in the latter, that we were bringing freedom and democracy to the Middle East (at least, this was what began to be used after the WMD argument fell through), but yet, in both cases, the rhetoric and actions taken can easily be couched within cynical interest-based assessments of economic factors such as the benefits of a stable OPEC system and the ability of Iraq to stably produce oil for global markets in the case of the latter.  There's no reason why both the more ideas-based and cynical cost/benefit analyses trains of thought aren't correct here, and looking at the aftermath of both conflicts, the outcomes support both notions - while the Gulf War resulted in the destruction of infrastructure in both Kuwait and Iraq, Iraq came out facing heavy sanctions, which would be undone in 2003 so that Western investments into Iraq could revitalize the oil-producing sector of the country's economy ("revitalize" is a subjective term here, I don't necessarily agree that's exactly what happened, but neoliberals will), with the added benefit of having deposed a long-time dictator and laid the framework for free elections within Iraq.  In this case, you can see that both normative and rational analysis-based trains of thought for entering the conflicts from the US' point of view were eventually achieved.

Week 3 (Pre-Class): The Foundation of Politics

The Foundation of Politics

Ideas and Interests, Politics and Realpolitik

In her post this week, Kirstin, makes an excellent point that it seems almost illogical that the importance of ideas has not been perpetually tied to the study of politics. As she states, what, if anything but ideas themselves, forms the foundation of politics? Are cultures and modes of governance not in-and-of-themselves rooted in a base idea of how the world should be? I imagine this will be an important point of contention during our upcoming synchronous session.

I'd like to chime in with my two cents on the subject. I wholeheartedly agree with Kirstin's suggestion that the two should be linked, but I'd go a step further: ideas and interests should not be looked at through a black-and-white lens either. In my opinion, as you can probably tell from my previous posts, the world is foolishly viewed through a melodramatic black-and-white lens whereas in actuality, it is defined by shades of gray.

Certainly interests and ideas are different concepts, as defined and discussed in this week's pre-class material, but are they separate? I don't think so. To a certain extent I would argue that ideas form the basis of interests because they help define our views of the world, and thus our views of the context of our environment. To this end, someone that subscribes firmly to the ideas of personal freedom and democracy, are, in my opinion, more likely to find those notions in their category of interests than someone who has a more authoritarian view of the world. Similarly, a person who subscribes to the notion that fiscal conservatism is an important idea or base value of a society, then their calculated decision-making process (interest) is more likely to be guided by this idea than someone who subscribes to fiscal liberalism. The point that I'm trying to make is that homo sociologicus and homo economicus are not separate species, instead, they are two halves of the same whole. As Hobbes states, facts may be universal, but how we perceive them is not. As such, no one person (or machine) can be without bias, and bias is formed from our ideas. As a result, in my understanding of the world, our politics define our realpolitik.

Week 3 Reflections

Coming in new to the field of international relations, I am perplexed by the discovery through our readings that ideas ever fell out of favor in political theory.   What is theory if not a collection of ideas?  What is political that did not emanate from an idea, a thought, a conception?   Why wouldn’t ideas affect policy?  Regardless one’s definition, it seems odd in a social discipline to dismiss “idea” as superfluous to, or conceptually competitive with, rational behavior.   

Weber makes a case for a “specifically formed rationalism of Western civilization” (160).  But, even from an admittedly ethnocentric perspective (160), he couches it in an examination of both Hellenic-influenced Western and non-Western development of science, technology, economics and culture.  Evolution of any of these is dependent on context, on cultural influence, and on ideas.   And, as suggested by our Module 2 readings and lecture, there is no reason these influences and rational dynamics cannot inhabit the same theoretical space. They need not be mutually exclusive, but to the extent they are measureable, considered rather in degrees of influence. 

As Goldstein and Keohane state, “Policy changes can be influenced by ideas both because new ideas emerge and as a result of changes in underlying conditions affecting the impact of existing ideas (30).”  They conclude, “If we really thought ideas were irrelevant, our lives as social scientists would be meaningless. Our exploration of the impact of ideas on foreign policy is also a search for person meaning and relevance in our own lives (30).”  But, Goldstein and Keohane also define “ideas” in terms of “world views,” “principled beliefs,” and “causal beliefs” (8-11).   

Like Laffey and Weldes, I view these definitions as “strained (205),” however for very different reason.  I feel they belong in a different box.  Laffey’s and Weldes’ “symbolic technology” metaphor is interesting and I can see why they argue for it.  Still, it seems more of the same – an attempt to reinvent something that loses its essence in the process.   

A quick online definition search (Oxford Dictionaries) does suggest “idea” and “belief” are synonymous.  However, the application is specific to one particular usage of each – “opinion.”  In the case of “concept,” “theory,” “thought,” the relationship is absent. “Idea” suggests something that enters consciousness, something mentally conjured, new.   It may or may not be rational.  It may draw from science or culture or any of a number of stimuli.  It may or may not develop into a belief or worldview.  It exists to morph to one degree or another.   For example, even as I write, I understand that what I conceive now, in the moment, may be entirely misguided, or require exploration, expansion or refinement.  I may immediately change my mind on the entire argument after posting.  Despite the definitive nature of my statement about it, the idea has not developed into a belief or a worldview or a value.  While it can be, an idea is not reliant on the perspective of its originator for its genesis, but can stand alone as something to consider or to ponder. Depending on its makeup, it can be shared readily beyond the cultural boundaries of its origin.  Ideas invite question marks or ellipses.   

A belief requires adoption by its owner and trust in its composition.   It may derive from an idea, it may change, but the very notion of “belief” is as conviction.  It is an idea that has gelled.  Altering it requires significant effort on the actor’s part.  And, like values, beliefs spring typically from culture but sit tightly with the individual.  Laffey and Weldes allude to this in arguing against “ideas as beliefs” – and assert that Goldstein and Keohane recognize the difference as well (206).   

So my question then becomes, why not discard the metaphors altogether and work across schools of thought on refining definitions as explicitly as possible?   If the object truly is “international relations,” and not simply intriguing exchanges between academics, then would we not want to get beyond arguing ever-more complex metaphorical references?  They do not seem to translate well. 

Professor Jackson’s lecture resonated.  I look forward to discussion in class on ideas and interest, but even more so on motive and intent.      

References:

Max Weber, “Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion,” in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Stephen Kalberg (Roxbury, 2002).

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Cornell University Press, 1993).

Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, “Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 3:2 (1997).

Interests vs Ideas

The material for this week seemed, to me, difficult compared to Hobbes (hard to believe, right?).  For some reason, I just could not easily follow the train of thought concerning the employment of ideas or interests in decision making for individuals and states.  Once I got some traction in my brain, I was able to draw some connections and chew on some ideas (regular normal thoughts, not the norms and values I adopted from the culture I grew up in) for consideration.

Part of my problem originated with definitions.  Hobbes was definitely onto something when he started his writings with long and detailed definitions of the terms he planned to utilize.  Eventually, Professor Jackson does eventually define these two seemingly synonymous words, thank goodness; I do wish that had been the very first point though.  Having my own conceptual definitions of interests, ideas, motive, and intent, I was initially self-deceived.  From my understanding (and please correct me if I am wrong), interests are strategically calculations based on facts; ideas are norms and values adopted after prolonged exposure to a certain culture.  After determining the context in which these terms were being used, I found myself wondering, like the Professor asked, “why does it even matter if states or individuals make decisions based on interests or ideas?”.

Well, it matters.  Goldstein and Keohane claim that ideas, particularly ideas that change, can have a huge impact on world political actions (Goldstein, 9).  On a slightly less international scale, Professor Jackson gave an example in his lecture of McDonald’s and their switch from Styrofoam packing containers to paper wraps.  This switch in material could be looked at under the lens of either interests or ideas and be seen as feasible explanations.  As an individual, it matters to me if they were honestly seeking to be the best environmentally sustainable business they could be, or if they used it as a marketing tool to garner more profit.  Ultimately, yes, the result is the same, McDonald’s is more environmentally sound, but the question of their business character is up in the air, and character weighs heavily in my book.

Despite the fact that it matters, there is still no way to positively determine if actors (state or individuals) utilize either interests or ideas to make decisions.  It’s impossible to know the inner workings of a human being.  Even if they were to say it out loud, it’s not guaranteed to be the truth (Jeremiah 17:9).  While it may be possible to identify some interests or ideas that influence decisions, pinpointing is still beyond our means.

Reflection: Hobbes' State of Nature

Little something I'd intended to post last week but apparently never hit "publish" on - this was supposed to be a post-class entry, now I guess it's a post-post class entry.  Oh well, I'll take that one on the chin.

  For this week, I wanted to reflect a bit on Hobbes' description of the "state of nature," beginning with its abstract meanings as we discussed Tuesday, and attempt to extrapolate those to the real world.  It's perhaps a bit ironic knowing what we do of Hobbes, but in his state of nature, everyone is more or less endowed with the same general rights with no hierarchy to denote any additional exclusive rights or claims a person may have (so much for the divine right of kings?).  In absence of any hierarchy, men are effectively equal to each other, and are forced into competition over resources if they wish to survive, and have the right to do whatever they deem necessary in order to preserve their own survival.  Though, here, "right" shouldn't be considered in a legal sense as there's obviously no institutions in place to recognize that right - here, perhaps "might" is the best understanding of Hobbes' idea, that individuals have the power to do whatever they can in order to preserve themselves.  Hobbes calls this a "war of all against all," for it's his belief that in this state, violence and coercion are inevitable consequences as people go about securing resources for their own needs.

  Hobbes' state of nature is intended to be considered in abstract, though he argues that we see glimpses of the state of nature during civil wars.  Writing during the midpoint of the English Civil Wars (Charles I had just been executed in 1649, prompting his son to launch an invasion of Scotland in 1650, while Leviathan was published in 1651), Hobbes had already been witness to much violence, perhaps coloring his views somewhat - in his mind, it seems almost certain that Parliamentarians and their inability to cooperate with the monarchy had been responsible for causing the conflict, thus Parliament would be a feature best left out of the kingdom once it had been restored in his view.

  These ideas got me thinking about what Hobbes might have to say about civil wars that have occurred after his death and what he might think of their outcomes.  Particularly interesting to me is the French Revolution and its aftermath, though the 20th Century has provided no shortage of interesting case studies.

  The French Revolution's causes are still up for debate by historians, though there is some agreement over the fact that unpopular taxation schemes (intended to cover debts of the Seven Years' War and American Revolutionary War) coupled with bad harvests had combined to produce a festering resentment of the aristocracy and of the monarch among the common folk.  Under Hobbes' view, the revolution likely would have been considered unjust, for the most part, the French military was still able to defend its citizens.  Interestingly, this capability did not erode after the abolition of monarchy and execution of Louis XIV, instead France was successful in a series of wars lasting the next 20 years.  However, the installation of Napoleon as dictator in 1799 muddies the story of the Revolution's success somewhat.  Having killed their King, and the aristocracy during the Reign of Terror, Hobbes would likely say that in absence of a strong sovereign, the people clamored to install a new one the moment he arose before them - perhaps a return to order preferred by Hobbes, as this, at least, falls in-line with his social contract theory perfectly.

Dates retrieved from (and cursory knowledge of French Revolution refreshed by):
"Principal Dates and Time Line of the French Revolution." Principal Dates and Time Line of the French Revolution. Accessed September 15, 2016. https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/timeline.htm.

Growing Pains

Reflecting on our cursory group explorations of international organizations striving toward reasonable cooperation, it bears considering we have only just put our toe in the water.   We attempt perspective, but see global community through the lens of a very short history of broad international engagement and young, idealized forms of government and economy.  Democracy, the dominant filter, while visited to some degree in our ancient past, is historically new, an experiment we continue to refine, playing with means by which to temper it because in its purest form, it is unwieldy on the scale of application necessary to national governance.   We salt each experiment, to varying degrees with republicanism, socialism and even oligarchic or autocratic elements.   From a Western perspective, it is good, it is ours, but It is not a perfect animal.    

Just as Hobbesian theory emerges against a backdrop of profound scientific discovery, a century of religious discord, the Thirty-Year War, and the ever-present arm of the Church, contemporary socio-political dynamics unfold on the tail of an equivalent timeframe marked by unprecedented technological advances, world war, cold war, guerilla wars of scale, technological warfare, and a relatively recent universal awareness of the vast spectrum of cultures and belief systems we share between us.  This recognition at once, fosters appreciation for diversity and community, and fuels extremism and separatism.  We are evolving and understandably tripping along the way.  But, for all the bumps, we are making some positive progress.

As one group (Erica, Kristin, Andrew) notes in referring to the Peace of Westphalia, attempts at cooperation are not new, but morph through time.  We mature, they evolve.   The world shrinks, our efforts grow.  The formation of the League of Nations constituted a concerted attempt to reconcile, on a global scale and preemptively, our competitive and cooperative inclinations.  For several reasons cited by the group, it failed, but laid the groundwork for the next incarnation of a global body in the United Nations. Humankind seeks peace in spite of itself.

 

The organizations discussed in our class presentations have several things in common. Most notably, they strive for a rational approach to cooperation, but are structurally wanting in means by which to ensure compliance.   They tend to be more successful, as a whole, on social and economic endeavors than on those related to stability and peace. They are not granted teeth for the latter.   Politically, we have not matured sufficiently to omit coercive mechanisms from any of these without sacrificing the efficacy of the agency, nor have we found means by which to consistently and effectively employ coercion.   The UNSC is a particularly frustrating case in point.  Its very mission would seem to warrant an international security force distinct from the those of the nations which it represents and, as the presenting group (Kyra, Jesse and Christine) noted, departure from a self-defeating power structure within both it and the larger organization. Though possibly necessary to the entity’s viable inception, these are remnants of another time.     

The thinker, however brilliant, is bound by temporal context.  Hobbes sought answers in absolute albeit, popularly sanctioned, sovereignty.  If one were to liken socio-political development to that of a single human being, this could be compared to the desire of a child expanding discovery of the world, still unable to completely release itself from its parent’s hand. It feels the enormity of the world and comfort in the thought of absolute authority to provide security.  From the perspective of a later time, that world, if tumultuous, is small.  Hobbes proposes a solution to civil war, but his discussion beyond his familiar world eludes to “other” as threat from which the state must defend.   As we discussed in class at length, concepts Hobbes introduced, in addition to principles of state sovereignty and balance of power that came out of the Peace of Westphalia in his day, remain foundational to the development of social, political and economic world in which we find ourselves today.  Others, despite eloquent delivery, fail to resonate.  It was time to let go. We evolved through a subsequent age of revolution, rebellion reminiscent of early adolescence, inspired by thinkers who drew from Hobbes, but formulated entirely different perspectives regarding the rights of man and equality.  For all our progress, I would suggest we are still navigating social and political adolescence as, in the face of threats potentially lethal to us a species, our world calls to us collectively to do something other than do battle, dig in our heels, or submit.