Week 3 Reflections

Coming in new to the field of international relations, I am perplexed by the discovery through our readings that ideas ever fell out of favor in political theory.   What is theory if not a collection of ideas?  What is political that did not emanate from an idea, a thought, a conception?   Why wouldn’t ideas affect policy?  Regardless one’s definition, it seems odd in a social discipline to dismiss “idea” as superfluous to, or conceptually competitive with, rational behavior.   

Weber makes a case for a “specifically formed rationalism of Western civilization” (160).  But, even from an admittedly ethnocentric perspective (160), he couches it in an examination of both Hellenic-influenced Western and non-Western development of science, technology, economics and culture.  Evolution of any of these is dependent on context, on cultural influence, and on ideas.   And, as suggested by our Module 2 readings and lecture, there is no reason these influences and rational dynamics cannot inhabit the same theoretical space. They need not be mutually exclusive, but to the extent they are measureable, considered rather in degrees of influence. 

As Goldstein and Keohane state, “Policy changes can be influenced by ideas both because new ideas emerge and as a result of changes in underlying conditions affecting the impact of existing ideas (30).”  They conclude, “If we really thought ideas were irrelevant, our lives as social scientists would be meaningless. Our exploration of the impact of ideas on foreign policy is also a search for person meaning and relevance in our own lives (30).”  But, Goldstein and Keohane also define “ideas” in terms of “world views,” “principled beliefs,” and “causal beliefs” (8-11).   

Like Laffey and Weldes, I view these definitions as “strained (205),” however for very different reason.  I feel they belong in a different box.  Laffey’s and Weldes’ “symbolic technology” metaphor is interesting and I can see why they argue for it.  Still, it seems more of the same – an attempt to reinvent something that loses its essence in the process.   

A quick online definition search (Oxford Dictionaries) does suggest “idea” and “belief” are synonymous.  However, the application is specific to one particular usage of each – “opinion.”  In the case of “concept,” “theory,” “thought,” the relationship is absent. “Idea” suggests something that enters consciousness, something mentally conjured, new.   It may or may not be rational.  It may draw from science or culture or any of a number of stimuli.  It may or may not develop into a belief or worldview.  It exists to morph to one degree or another.   For example, even as I write, I understand that what I conceive now, in the moment, may be entirely misguided, or require exploration, expansion or refinement.  I may immediately change my mind on the entire argument after posting.  Despite the definitive nature of my statement about it, the idea has not developed into a belief or a worldview or a value.  While it can be, an idea is not reliant on the perspective of its originator for its genesis, but can stand alone as something to consider or to ponder. Depending on its makeup, it can be shared readily beyond the cultural boundaries of its origin.  Ideas invite question marks or ellipses.   

A belief requires adoption by its owner and trust in its composition.   It may derive from an idea, it may change, but the very notion of “belief” is as conviction.  It is an idea that has gelled.  Altering it requires significant effort on the actor’s part.  And, like values, beliefs spring typically from culture but sit tightly with the individual.  Laffey and Weldes allude to this in arguing against “ideas as beliefs” – and assert that Goldstein and Keohane recognize the difference as well (206).   

So my question then becomes, why not discard the metaphors altogether and work across schools of thought on refining definitions as explicitly as possible?   If the object truly is “international relations,” and not simply intriguing exchanges between academics, then would we not want to get beyond arguing ever-more complex metaphorical references?  They do not seem to translate well. 

Professor Jackson’s lecture resonated.  I look forward to discussion in class on ideas and interest, but even more so on motive and intent.      

References:

Max Weber, “Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion,” in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Stephen Kalberg (Roxbury, 2002).

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Cornell University Press, 1993).

Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, “Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 3:2 (1997).