Who Won? Reflections on Module 3 Class Debate

Reflections on Module 3 Class Debate

While team coordination was a challenge, the exercise in taking a position on whether the international environment can be fundamentally remade was worthwhile.  I enjoyed, to some extent, playing off one another as a team in composing arguments and felt the activity as a whole lent some clarity to all we had discussed to date.   That said, it was very difficult for many to join in when they would have liked due to other obligations and work constraints.  Like some others who have noted similar sentiment in their blogs, I am concerned the schedule for composing team positions and rebuttals assumes all or most, across time zones and with varying work and travel schedules, are available to contribute equally on very specific dates.  It may have played out more effectively over a loose timeline and perhaps as an in-character discussion rather than a team debate with formal openers and rebuttals.   The assignment of pros and cons would be the one component I would keep in place, adding a requirement for all to contribute at least twice to the discussion over the course of the week.  Those with other obligations (work, family, etc.) might, in this way, have had more opportunity to significantly contribute with the flexibility to write over the course of six days rather than two. 

Regarding who won, though I was on the “pro” side and do stand by that position, I felt the “con” team did an excellent job articulating their argument.  In that sense, I feel they won the debate.  They gained ground in noting the quadrupling of sovereign states in less than a century and reiterating Waltz’s argument that historically, we tend to circle back to the familiar.  The team, from my perspective, lost some ground in its dismissal of “common ground” platforms as fundamental transformations. They make a statement regarding new institutions as solely rational, interest-based mechanisms to retool negotiations, cooperation and compromise more efficiently That may be the case to a certain degree, but they fail to acknowledge that this kinder, gentler approach, in itself, is historically new, and a step toward the next incremental change.  Fundamental change would not occur suddenly and I found it interesting that one argument made from the “con” team - that change would be an evolution not a revolution – was the same one made by the “pro” team in our opening statement: “Our world is evolving…this is not an abrupt shift, but rather growth or adaptation to contextual stimuli….”  And, toward the end of the opener, another statement that incremental change does not mean a “new order” that emerges from that evolution is not fundamentally different from the thing that came at the start.   We cannot compare the time period between the inception of rational organizations such as the U.N. and the WTO – no more than a few decades - to the centuries between Hobbes and those organizations.  It would be like comparing the span the time between the advent of agriculture and the city-state organization of Ancient Greece to a Greece-Rome comparison.   We see fundamental change in the longer term.  Territoriality, for instance, would seem more “fundamental” or “inherent” from the fixed cultural perspective of an agricultural society – or one founded in that tradition – than from a nomadic perspective.

The pro team made some good points.  Those related to cooperation, from the Paris Agreement to human rights activity were especially strong.  Where I feel we dropped the ball was in developing and refining many of our points more cohesively as a team.   For the debate as a whole, there may have been some opportunity, in looking at each argument, to clarify concepts (it seems many have brought this up) and to refine what was presented.  Again, though, even without the in-character class experience, I think we all gained some perspective from the activity.

Week 6 (Post-Class): Context Theory

'Context Theory'

An argument against a change in the international realm

Fair warning: this turned out to be significantly longer than I expected! Maybe I should have just posted my mid-semester essay instead. In any case, enjoy! (and tell me what you think of course!)

I'll be honest, I've sat on this post for some time because I'm not entirely sure what to talk about following various posts and a short essay on essentially the same (read: a similar) subject. I feel like it would not have been appropriate to branch off into a separate discussion- the argument about change in the international realm has been the central topic of our course for the last few weeks. All of this having been said, I got a benefit that some of my classmates did not. In our in class assigned discussions, I was fortunately tasked with arguing for a side that I happened to agree with (for the most part).

Writing about this topic several times has enabled me to refine my argument. The purpose of this entry is to share the argument I made in my recent mid-semester essay. To this end, my argument focuses on the notion that the international realm is based on the fundamentals of human behavior. Culture and identity are an incredibly important part of the human experience, and it has been since we first achieved sentience- and likely, before.

In international relations, the notion of the nation remains central to the stability of the state. A nation-state without a nation is only held together by coercion. That is not stable. However, that is not to imply that national identity has any sort of permanence either, instead the difference between national identity and coercion is willful co-identification versus mandatory conformity. Such identity, based on a perception of common culture, is central to forming a nation. Further, much as we are taught in American University's Intercultural Communications course, culture and identity revolve around contrast. Specifically, it is the notion that you cannot understand (and thus fully comprehend) your own culture and identity without stepping into and experiencing another. As the old saying goes, light does not exist without dark. One culture and identity cannot exist without a foreign one to contrast it against. Otherwise, that original identity would be without purpose.

I propose that what we are witnessing in the international realm is not in fact a change in the fundamental operating principles of anarchy, but instead the rise of new nations based on the changing context of the 21st century and with it, a shift in international boundaries. The case-in-point here is the European Union. A growing European nation is evolving from the smaller nations of Europe much in the same way that a fledgling American nation evolved from the separate American nations of the original Thirteen Colonies. Admittedly, the convergence of European nations may be more drastic. Nevertheless, a new nation is emerging in the context of the 21st century as Europe must come together to compete with larger states ranging from America in the west to Russia, India and China to the east. Ultimately, as this evolution takes place - presuming it is not derailed by the compound crises of the early 21st century - European international borders will shift to the periphery of the bloc. In the end, however, the space that exists between those new boundaries and nations that lay beyond them is still anarchy.

Such anarchy is reinforced by the fact that while international organizations exist to regulate the relationship between nations, they do not supersede the sovereign authority of the nations which subscribe to them. The survival of sovereign authority is evidenced by the fact nations enter into such organizations and agreements willingly. They subscribe to constraints willingly. Sovereignty is not ceded; codes of reasonable behavior, that are in the relative self-interest of all partied states, are agreed upon. All nations, however, remain capable of seceding from such organizations and agreements.

To this end, the UN Security Council remains an oddity that may, at first glance, contravene this argument. In writing at least, it has the authority to intervene when it sees threats to international peace and security. This may erode the notion of sovereign authority. In practice, such intervention only occurs when the sovereign states that comprise the UNSC agree that a certain course of action is agreeable. Because the UNSC is not in and of itself sovereign, it is only comprised of sovereign states that agree to joint decisions. There has not been a true cessation of sovereignty in the way that the states that comprise the United States have ceded sovereignty to the federal government, or in the way that European states have ceded sovereignty to the EU (their aspiring federal government). Instead, the UNSC can only impose its decisions by force - martial, economic, or otherwise - not be legal action backed by the understanding that it is sovereign over a state. We see this occur in practice as states who end up on the wrong end of a UNSC resolution rarely bow to it willingly in the way American states or European countries do.

To conclude then, I restate that what we are witnessing is the evolution of new nations and the shifting of boundaries, based on the changing context of the 21st century, but not fundamental change away from the inherent anarchy that exists between sovereign human groups.

Week 6 (post class)

Is Fundamental Change Possible?

Over the past week, our class has been divided into warring factions: those who argued that the international system CAN be changed, and those who argued that it CAN’T.  I fell into this latter category, and am so thankful to be able to “break character” today because I am a firm believer in change.  While I think my team did a marvelous job in laying out a con argument for purpose of the learning exercise, I found my self wrestling my own mind to consider that fundamental changes just don’t happen, that we have been the same international system since the Greeks.  While we are obviously not living like the Greeks today, the argument is that the states of anarchy and power are relatively the same and will continue to be as they have always been. 

This belief truly saddens me.  If there is no room for fundamental change, why bother with politics, international relations, government, war, etc…?  What’s the point?  Just the idea of change provides hope and encouragement for those who see today’s international system as broken but mendable, whether or not that change provides positive or negative outcomes is, objectively, irrelevant; if change is possible that means a different world is possible.  I believe in the ability to change the international system on a fundamental basis; it may take years, more than a single generation even, but I truly believe it is possible.

I really like one of the comments in the opening statement from the pro side: “When the number of powers increases, Waltz suggests that states shift away from advancing their own interests and toward seeking a common denominator.”  This shift towards common denominators is highly relevant in today’s world as the group succinctly exemplifies in their statement.  Even the inclusion of non-state actors doesn’t hamper this development, but instead provides more stabilization.

We argued for the con that fundamental change is not possible because two of the fundamental elements of the international system cannot change: actors and interests.  Rather, only the calculations and methods to obtain interests changes. What a gloomy life.  While I do not doubt that actors often manipulate and restructure institutions to reach their desired end state/interests, I do not agree that it is the only occurring action of “change”.  In class, Professor Shirk once mentioned that this fundamental change might not come until something as external as an alien invasion takes place, when a common enemy creates a new division of the proverbial “us” and “them”.  While our con argument did bring this up, I think it was used for the wrong argument.

As Dan is always so quick to point out, the middle ground is also an option in the theories we discuss in this class: some change is fundamental, some is “disguised” as cosmetic restructuring of institutions.  And that’s where I think I am, in the middle, although certainly leaning more towards the possibility of fundamental change.

Week 5 (Pre-Class): A Brighter Future or a Return of History?

A Brighter Future or a Return of History?

The Origins and Conclusions of Values and Benefits

     In order to understand the international system well enough to be able to answer the question, "Can it be changed?," one must first look at the parts which make it up. As has been established in this course many times over, we live in a world of sovereign nation-states. Whether that world is changing or not is not the focus of this particular entry. Instead it will be more of a discussion on my point of view on the origins of values and benefits (payoff structures, related to interests), then ultimately, how those origins affect the world we live in. The ultimate goal is to define the international realm, and the actors which make it up, as a category of the 2x2 chart discussed in class.

     The assumption we work with (from the perspective of this author) is that all human beings begin as a blank slate with no predisposition toward one particular way of thinking or another. That having been said, governments (the precise term being systems of government, or regimes) and societies are similar, generally because they are comprised of people - a fact often forgotten.

     My theory on all of this is something like the riddle of the chicken and the egg. I firmly believe that in the course of human history, dating back to the earliest civilizations, circumstances (the environment, both natural and man-made) affect strategic interests (aka goals that achieve perceived benefits) and those interests then help to define values. So in this case, the chicken (interests) comes before the egg (values). What then, created the chicken that laid the egg? The answer is, in my academic opinion, the environment. The interactions and effects that the circumstances have had and presently have on both interests and values, and the change that occurs as a result, most closely the analog of evolution.

     So, the circumstances (environment), through evolution, produces the chicken (interests), which produces the egg (values) - critically, evolution is not a singular event, it continues to this day - that is why things change. It is important to note that because the evolutionary process is cyclical, this does not preclude values from eventually affecting interests. Past values do have an effect the following cycle of interests much in the same way that a when a hen lays an egg, that egg's genetic material affects the next generation of chickens.

     Since we are looking to define how things change, it is critical to note that change is of course possible. There is evidence of this in human history, particularly in the 20th century. So how do things change? The theory I present, as stated, is that change follows a pattern of evolution. Through a change in circumstances, benefits are affected, which alter interests that ultimately define values, et cetera, et cetera and the cycle repeats. Given this, the best way to generate change is inherently an alternation of the circumstances that govern benefits (payoff structures). Over time, this will cause a shift in interests and eventually, another shift in values. The greatest example of this theory can be seen in the evolution of industrialized warfare and the advent of nuclear weapons. Once the payoff structure made the cost-benefit ratio of war between great powers too costly, interests and then values began to change. Today such conflict, in a direct manner, is far less likely than it was 100 years ago.

     Thank you for bearing with that analogy, but I hope that it made this idea easier to communicate. What are your thoughts on this theory and on change in the international arena as a whole?

Week 5: Is Anarchy Really What States Make of it?

Hey all, I'm in the process of getting back into the swing of things, expect backlogged postings to come over the next day or two.  I'm maybe not fully back up to full capacity yet, but at this point I need something to keep myself focused on.

For this week I wanted to tackle the question of whether the international system can be remade and whether change is possible in the system in a bit of a roundabout way - by examining whether the possibility for change has been built into the current organizing structure of the international system.

I'm going to begin by taking the cynical view on most states' pathways to change - that most all states are trapped in the "Hobbesian state of nature" of autonomous states with impermeable boundaries.  There's an interesting argument that says that the development of the modern nation-state is really inevitably intertwined with the development of armies and military technology during the Renaissance and Enlightenment.  This argument states that as pikes and muskets became the primary weapons of war, armies needed to grow and so too did the bureaucracies and government agencies to manage them - the replacement of mercenary armies which required a large tax collecting agency to be able to fund with professional standing armies paid with regular wages and afforded certain extra benefits of the state representing the last major shift in organization.  I think this argument can fairly easily be extended to the modern-day state in the international system, although the scale has certainly expanded greatly during the 20th Century.  If security is the key function of every state, this is sort of an inevitable outcome - that each state would begin to take on similar forms in order to manage the army most capable of defending itself and its interests against other modern armies with similar capabilities.

Here, I'd like to dive into Waltz' exploration of anarchy as permissive cause of war.  While it seems obvious that states will inevitably go to war with each other in absence of anything to stop them, the advent of bodies that intend to crack down on the outbreak of warfare hasn't put a stop to warfare entirely - it's merely changed the way states think about war.  The "proxy" wars as seen in Ukraine, Yemen, and Syria recently are examples of this shift - getting around limits to the permissible "just" causes of war has become as much of a concern for major powers as much as the warfare being carried out itself.  Despite the best efforts of international organizations such as the UN, war yet breaks out, and as recent actions by Russia have indicated, the international system won't always be capable of preventing it.

I agree that the practice of sovereign territoriality has to go (or at least undergo significant change) if we're to be able to shake off warfare and the anarchy that serves as catalyst for warfare, but with recent political trends in Europe and the US, I'm not convinced that we're close to doing so - while many clamor for stronger borders and more definite expressions of sovereignty/territory in the forms of border walls and immigration bans (such as that recently voted on by Hungary), we are to remain stuck in this territorial mode of organization.

I'll likely edit this post throughout the week to flesh out my ideas more thoroughly and clearly, I've still got a bit to say on the subject.

Week 5 Pre-Class

Can the international environment be fundamentally remade?  To answer this question, it is important to first identify and understand what the fundamentals actually are.  I think our readings for the next two weeks seek to elucidate some of those fundamentals.

Onus starts us out with some very basic terms and defines how the relationships between these terms affects the constructivists idea of the world.  These terms being rules, agents, and institutions (I particularly like his example of duck season, brought back memories of Donald Duck and Bugs Bunny arguing about duck season vs rabbit season).  Defining these terms helps to pinpoint links between seemingly unrelated matters.  At the center of constructivism is the proposition that humans are social beings and would not be human but for social relations.  These relations and interactions are crucial to the remainder of his text in explaining constructivism in context.  Onus also postulates that "talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we make the world what it is", a direct correlation to the social nature of humans.

I found Waltz's piece on the Origins of War in Neorealist Theory particularly interesting as it regards nuclear weapons and the importance of military technology and strategy in the development of international relations.  Maintaining a constructivists view that humans are social and talking is important to shaping the world, it is easy for me to envision the progression of nuclear weapons playing large roles in the scaling of war between hot and cold.  Waltz is also careful to note that war is normal, and not unexpected.  Interactions between agents and collective agents (countries), can contribute greatly to multi-polar or bipolar political worlds, which then in turn lead to various levels of conventional war.  While the author gives positives and negatives for both types of political polarity, he is very clear in arguing that the mere presence of nuclear weapons holds great sway in the development of conditions for war.  Anarchical ordering in the international arena fosters cold wars, and cold wars foster hot wars.

Looking at these fundamentals (rules, agents, war), of the international environment, I think maybe they can me remade.  Not quickly, but over time as Kristin proposes in her blog post.  Referring back to Onus's comment that talking is most important, I believe the dialogue that occurs between international actors is a constant voice for changing the way the world works.

Contextual Considerations - Week 5

In pondering the questions proposed by Professor Jackson in the Module 3 lecture, I found myself hyper-conscious of the temporal context of each of the readings.  “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” was written in the Spring of 1988.  In it, Waltz defends not only realism, but nuclear armament, stating, “The probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.” Rational states would be the qualifier (though I am not sure that is entirely a guarantee either).   An irrational North Korean keeper of these, for instance,  would not have been a consideration.  The essay’s perspective, as each would, rested heavily on its historical context. Some do this more than do others.

The 2001, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” following the apex of the dot.com era and economic boom, fits things into neat little interest- based boxes. And, it makes sense there.  But, it lacks substance.  Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, to their credit, invited commentary from Alexander Wendt, who they tell us “questions our decision to focus on rational choice explanations without directly engaging either competing approaches or what he believes are complementary but ‘deeper’ explanations (799).” From an admittedly far less informed position, I nevertheless wholeheartedly agree.   

As with the last module, I am drawn to the contextually inclusiveness of constructivism.  The Wendt piece, written in the Spring of 1992, speaks to bridging schools of thought (394) and “intersubjectivity.”  Wendt states, “It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions … Identities are inherently relational.”   And Onuf notes that even “autonomy is always limited by the (limited) autonomy of the other agents (20).”  We are social creatures.  Relationship and context drive us.   Power, according to Wendt is also relative to those.  “If society ‘forgets’ what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist.”

So, to Professor Jackson’s question regarding the feasibility of change in the practice of sovereign territoriality, I would say it is not only feasible, but inevitable.  As I mention in a comment to Kyra’s September 30 blog, our world is morphing, boundaries are becoming more permeable, not the least due to the communications technology that makes our AU forum possible.   What will it look like?  We are mid-morph.  I suppose what defines it will be clearer later on.  And, no, I do not think anarchy will forever produce the same outcome on the international stage.   We are growing up and, for all the pain associated at that, we are getting better in some ways at this global community thing.  I do think we can cooperate more effectively – maybe not substantially today, but not far away in time either.    

Week 4 (Post-Class): The Foundation of Politics, Part III

The Foundation of Politics, Part III

Class Presentations and the Motivations of Actors

     Part III! I don't think I've ever written a three-part, anything. In film that's how you know you've made it to the big leagues (you know, except Saw and Sharknado). In any case, I believe this discussion on ideas and interests warrants this third entry, not simply because of the class requirements, but almost entirely because of the significance of the topic. When looking at the meaning of the arguments surrounding ideas and interests, it is clear that understanding the true role of each will shed significant light on one's understanding of how actors are motivated to make the decisions that they do.

     The class presentations each served as excellent examples of how the notions of ideas and interests may play a part in international events. By and large, my classmates did an absolutely outstanding job of outlining each of their events with historical detail and excellent analysis of the motivators (both ideas and interests) of the parties involved. Some students even went a step further and highlighted the motivations of third parties that undoubtedly shaped the events in either a secondary or tangential way. For instance, in Jesse Shively's presentation the United States' motivations are included, and this is followed by an important analysis of the results. I thought that this inclusion of an analysis of results (a 'who won' slide) was excellent and necessary when looking at a historical event where the aftermath has had time to play itself out (mostly).

     In this same light, my other blog-mates also presented very strong arguments for the roles of ideas and interests in their respective international events. What I noticed, across the board, was how varied the styles and methods of such presentations of the motivators were. Some class-mates (as opposed to just blog-mates) chose to utilize an interests and/vs ideas approach, whereas others looked more towards the 'symbolic technologies' approach discussed in earlier entries of this series. In the end, I subscribe most to the notion that ideas are not intangible objects, but instead practices. Of all class-mates, I believe Kirstin and Courtney did the best job of detailing the relationship between the two motivators and the role of ideas in framing interests and, more importantly, actions.

     In the end, the reason I highlight these successes by my classmates is to not only give them credit where much credit is due, but more importantly to point the way towards different explanations of what I believe is a critical component of understanding international relations theory: 'How do motivators affect actions?' Once the answer(s?) to this question is understood, only then may we begin to truly understand the field of international relations.