Tuesday, October 4, 2016

Week 5: Is Anarchy Really What States Make of it?

Hey all, I'm in the process of getting back into the swing of things, expect backlogged postings to come over the next day or two.  I'm maybe not fully back up to full capacity yet, but at this point I need something to keep myself focused on.

For this week I wanted to tackle the question of whether the international system can be remade and whether change is possible in the system in a bit of a roundabout way - by examining whether the possibility for change has been built into the current organizing structure of the international system.

I'm going to begin by taking the cynical view on most states' pathways to change - that most all states are trapped in the "Hobbesian state of nature" of autonomous states with impermeable boundaries.  There's an interesting argument that says that the development of the modern nation-state is really inevitably intertwined with the development of armies and military technology during the Renaissance and Enlightenment.  This argument states that as pikes and muskets became the primary weapons of war, armies needed to grow and so too did the bureaucracies and government agencies to manage them - the replacement of mercenary armies which required a large tax collecting agency to be able to fund with professional standing armies paid with regular wages and afforded certain extra benefits of the state representing the last major shift in organization.  I think this argument can fairly easily be extended to the modern-day state in the international system, although the scale has certainly expanded greatly during the 20th Century.  If security is the key function of every state, this is sort of an inevitable outcome - that each state would begin to take on similar forms in order to manage the army most capable of defending itself and its interests against other modern armies with similar capabilities.

Here, I'd like to dive into Waltz' exploration of anarchy as permissive cause of war.  While it seems obvious that states will inevitably go to war with each other in absence of anything to stop them, the advent of bodies that intend to crack down on the outbreak of warfare hasn't put a stop to warfare entirely - it's merely changed the way states think about war.  The "proxy" wars as seen in Ukraine, Yemen, and Syria recently are examples of this shift - getting around limits to the permissible "just" causes of war has become as much of a concern for major powers as much as the warfare being carried out itself.  Despite the best efforts of international organizations such as the UN, war yet breaks out, and as recent actions by Russia have indicated, the international system won't always be capable of preventing it.

I agree that the practice of sovereign territoriality has to go (or at least undergo significant change) if we're to be able to shake off warfare and the anarchy that serves as catalyst for warfare, but with recent political trends in Europe and the US, I'm not convinced that we're close to doing so - while many clamor for stronger borders and more definite expressions of sovereignty/territory in the forms of border walls and immigration bans (such as that recently voted on by Hungary), we are to remain stuck in this territorial mode of organization.

I'll likely edit this post throughout the week to flesh out my ideas more thoroughly and clearly, I've still got a bit to say on the subject.

5 comments:

  1. I agree in principle that the evolution of the modern nation-state is linked to development, though not of armies. My line of thinking on this is that the evolution of the modern nation-state is more a result of the failure of an old system that spilled far more blood, for less clear and definitive reasons, and thus did no work to the advantage of the actors involved. Specifically, I'm referring to the Treaty of Westphalia as the point of change. There's an argument that the failure of the pre-Westphalian system is linked to technology and population growth. As populations grew and weapons became more efficient, constant and seemingly senseless religious warfare became unsustainable, in a similar way to how the Westphalian system became unsustainable in the early 20th century. Nevertheless, that's definitely debatable. In any case, what're your thoughts on this?

    Also, what role do you believe culture plays in the inability for us to get passed the sovereignty issue. My personal thoughts on the matter are that without a unifying force (aka, an outside actor), there is little to drive human cultures together in a way that would ultimately make supra-national sovereignty a possibility.

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    1. Whether or not military technology is inherently intertwined with the development of the modern nation state, I think it's definitely fair to say that technological innovations (overall) and societal revolutions coupled with advances in technology are probably explanatory of how states grew to become what they are today, as well.

      To your second point, culture definitely seems to be a unifying factor that's playing a role in our reluctance to move past sovereignty as it's currently thought of. While it certainly seems possible for similar cultures to easily congeal into supra-national states (Western Europe folding into the EU is an apt example, with participating states having undergone shared histories and having similar values rooted in mostly similar religious and societal teachings). I'll agree that I don't think the same thing could easily happen between Western nations and say, China, or even with "periphery" nations in Africa and the Middle-East. Probably, without some new threat to help humans get over our natural fears of "other" people - whether they look or believe differently, we're going to be stuck in the current system.

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  2. Jesse,

    Good point about what appears, at least for the moment, as a popular call for the reassertion of boundaries and sovereign territoriality in the West. Much of this is due to the apparent failures of globalization (which many argue are not actually happening). What do you think the factors for this rise are? Is realism 'beating' liberalism yet again?

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    1. I think "realism" (really, I think it should be called, simply, cynicism) is winning out in the short-term, and I'd agree that it's due to the 'failures' of globalization. Whether they're failures or not is certainly debatable, but in the case of the UK/Brexit, and the quick rise of Trumped-up conservatism in the US, it seems obvious that the changing economic landscapes of both countries (loss of manufacturing jobs due to trade deals + shift toward automation) as they've shifted toward service-based economies can account for a lot of frustration from working and middle-class voters in both countries.

      By the same token, ISIS specifically has proven to be a greater boogeyman than I think the "core" nations have seen before, even as it seems ISIS isn't particularly very interested in striking abroad so much as it is eking out control over Syria and Iraq. With recent attacks in the West inspired by ISIS, there's a certain natural amount of fear that arises in the public mind as a response. While this should be highly similar to what the nation went through shortly after 9/11, in watching the debates, it seems that a certain half of the country is under the impression that "not much is being done" about global terrorism. This is probably due to ISIS's high social media presence (at least as reported by the media, Twitter is actually very good about deleting their accounts as they find them) coupled with the low visibility of what's currently being done to fight terrorism - JSOC doesn't get as much airtime as the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

      I guess I'm saying that "realism," at least, the variety that seems to be making a popular resurgence, is really for the disaffected and terrified - but I'm not certain this differs so much from individual/personal level up through statehood.

      There's this whole other thing going on with ISIS that I'm not certain is relevant here, but it certainly interesting: it's kind of broken the mold of what was expected of non-governmental actors 20 years ago. Perhaps the fact that we now have a terrorist organization attempting to conduct itself as if it were a state is causing some sort of shock to the international system that wasn't predicted?

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