Week 10 Post-Class: Reflections on Inyatullah

It is impossible this week to escape discussions of ambiguity.  It is in our readings.  It is in the news.  It is in the blogs of my fellow students – Katherine’s touched particularly on some of the fears associated with its present implications.  And though the permeability of boundaries as an overarching theme in class might make these statements appear trite, it is a broader sense that we have just walked “through the looking glass” that is permeating the conscious thought of so many of us. It is bound to live in our socio-economic and political world for a while now. While the concepts we have been studying allude to ambiguities in blurred lines, overlapping constructs, and intersubjective relationships, we can wrap our heads around them. The results of our recent election are launching us into economic and political disorientations we did not have only a week ago. The concern with this could not relate more distinctly to our readings.  As ambiguity, seems to be in the air, it seemed appropriate to reflect on Naeem Inyatullah’s examination of the enigmatic nature of statehood in a globalized economy founded on a colonial model of capitalism.

In “Beyond the sovereignty dilemma: quasi-states as social construct,” Inyatullah speaks to both real and virtual subjection of weaker states to those stronger based on economic distribution and historic divisions in the production chain that favor wealth acquisition by successors to the colonial "home" state.  The weaker of those founded on this model are, despite formal recognition, effectively rendered quasi-states.  To grant them equal footing as states in the global community, Inyatullah imagines a world in which the system is retooled to align with a more objective concept of political economy based on the interdependence of economic players in the international arena.  In conceiving wealth as a right based on collective production by a global division of labor, he suggests each state contributor in the chain has a claim on the acquisition of that wealth.  Further each has a right to this acquisition in a more equitable and humane context than exists today.  

Two weeks ago, I would have been hopeful we could get there, if incrementally. I love Inyatullah’s vision.  But, in the near future, the world does not appear headed in that direction.  The market, against earlier predictions, is up after the election.  This is based, according to several articles out at the time of this writing, on faith in traditional capitalism over international social good – even where it may hurt the economy in the long run (Irwin, Nov 12; Krugman, Nov 14).  Sadly, this leaves it to those set up for failure by those compounding the problem to build the foundations for transformation.  

As it relates to Inyatulla’s “sovereignty dilemma” we seem to have resigned ourselves to exacerbating the disparities and contextual dissonance of our present model with complete and utter disregard to the historic injustice in global divisions of labor  - or our present ability to realign policy with a more equitable conception of the nature of state and sovereignty in relation to production and wealth acquisition.   

Week 10 Post-Class: Public Authority in a Globalized Age

Public Authority in a Globalized Age

The Weakening (and Re-assertion?) of the State

As has been a general theme of our class, the fringes of state power are not quite as clear cut as they may have been 100 years ago. My perception has, in general, been that the boundaries of a state's authority is very explicitly defined de jure, but has become much more porous de facto. This is not necessarily a bad thing as an interconnected world has allowed our economies to prosper and our wars to lessen. On the other hand, we have seen a weakening of the state's ability to affect many of the inter- or transnational actors operating within its borders.

There are many such examples of such weakening power. For one, the United States', though the most powerful actor on the international stage (and well established at home), has been unable to fully reign in the problem of tax evasion in foreign havens by its own corporations. Europeans have had similar challenges in reigning in foreign corporations who engage digitally with its citizens. On the other hand, more authoritarian states have made more progress in controlling such behavior, but at the expense of keeping these economically (or socially) beneficial entities out. For weaker nations, such violations of state authority can set a dangerous precedent and an overly-limiting state can prevent crucial economic activity that can be equally problematic.

Is there a balance? Likely, but it won't come from a single state or regional organization. One of the key themes of the Week 10 material is a "weakening of boundaries...but an absence of global public authority." This highlights the need for global authorities, through treaties, that create a standard (and binding) set of rules for such international non-state (and thus non-sovereign) actors. Tax evasion, data storage, private military organizations, etc. The list goes on, and without global standards to attack global issues in a coordinated manner, the list will grow. Unfortunately, in an age of interdependence, states must act together to face transnational activity if the state model of governance is to survive the 21st Century.

Week 9 Post-Class (Belated): A (Temporary) Case for Nuclear Deterrence

A (Temporary) Case for Nuclear Deterrence

Terrifying, yes, but the feeling is mutual*

     The credibility of nuclear deterrence should not be dismissed as it is one important factor among others that have kept the world's great powers at peace since the end of the Second World War. Let us not dismantle this mechanism until we find an appropriate, and effective, replacement.

     The history of mankind is long and complicated, but there is one theme which stretches its entirety...war. Whether we like it or not, humanity and conflict have been inextricably linked from the days of the first permanent settlements. In fact, of those original settlers, the first farmers, otherwise known as the first to tie themselves to geography (and the local resources), were more likely than any of his or her nomadic hunter-gatherer peers to die from blunt-force trauma caused by another human. This was inter-group competition, over territory, in its earliest known (human) form. The territoriality that we discussed in class, likewise contains our riches and is the basis from which we project our ideologies. The wars we wage, are simply modern manifestations of the same trends that date back countless millennia.

     Despite suggestions to the contrary, in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War, mankind has endured a relative peace unlike any other in its history. Fewer people are dying today from war and violence than at any other point in our history. In my view, there are three fundamental (though certainly not absolute) reasons for why this is so. The first is the liberal world order that was constructed following the end of the last world war. Through it, we have created a dynamic and relatively predictable, though admittedly fragile, system of global governance that benefits not only our international discourse (favoring diplomacy versus conflict as a first resort) though the creation of legitimate forums for exchange, but also our economies. I am a big believer in Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. To this lens I posit that nations, like people, are more inclined to favor dialogue and peace when their basic physiological and safety needs are met. Prosperity favors peace.

     The second factor(s) is the rise of mass media and democratic traditions. While certainly not universal in nature, the growth of mass media has awoken many to the true costs and brutality of war, moreover, in democratic societies (and in some less-than-democratic societies), this has increased the burden of a war weary society on the decision making process of governments. How this holds up when those basic needs are threatened (in times of economic or security crisis), is something to be seen.

    Finally, the third factor is the subject of this blog: nuclear deterrence. It was important to understand that such deterrence alone is not the only factor that contributes to the relative peace we live in, but nevertheless it contributes. The policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) may seem terrifying as Kirstin points out in her post, and it certainly is, but that is ultimately the point. The great powers are dissuaded by fear from pursuing large-scale conflict with one another. Such fear has prevented a return to the style of total industrialized warfare that plagued the first half of the 20th century and killed tens of millions.

     It is critical, however, to note the very clear weaknesses of this system. The asterisk in the sub-title is intended to highlight the flaws of MAD. There are two that I will focus on. The first is proliferation. Without question, I disagree with the notion that proliferation is a recipe for peace. It is not. It is the calculus of disaster. The reason MAD worked, and continues, generally, to work well, is because of the limited number of actors that are able to initiate a truly global nuclear exchange. The fewer the actors, the less room there is for miscalculation on anyone's behalf. This is why it is absolutely critical to ensure that the norm of non-proliferation is maintained and enforced. The threat of conflict grows exponentially with the addition of new nuclear powers. The second is access. This goes hand-in-hand with proliferation, but even in a world with perfect non-proliferation policies, the threat of irresponsible access remains a threatening specter. Should an irrational head of state, anywhere in the world, arise with more liberal views on the use of such weapons, this spells disaster. Good governance and accountability are the only true bulwarks here.

     This blog was a long and complicated way of saying that while in principle I agree with Kirstin, in practice, the realities are far more complex. I too believe that a world without the looming threat of nuclear Armageddon would be the ideal, but at the moment, a world without it only poses the far more likely threat of a return to industrialized on a massive scale in hot-spots around the world. We do not presently have sufficient global governance mechanisms, or other forms of deterrence, that would adequately prevent the world's great powers from wreaking havoc should their basic needs be threatened. The nuclear threat is unfortunately, the only such mechanism. In light of proliferation among the world's middle powers and violent extremists, the answer is that the great powers must work together to suppress such behavior in places like Iran, North Korea and around the world in an effort to ensure mutual security. Such cooperation is much more likely than not only the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, but also significantly more likely than the notion that, in its present form, a world without nuclear weapons would lead to an era of continued peace. On the contrary, without coercive deterrence, the use of coercive force would only heighten. The specter of unending wars of conquest would return.

Week 10 Post Class Blog

Global Economy and Economic Autonomy

 

Globalization has truly helped today’s corporations develop into their roles as private actors on an international scale.  Professor Jackson is quick to point out in his lecture, though, that corporations are dependent on states for their legal existence, while states are in no way reliant on corporations for legitimacy.  However, in the same way that some “weaker” states may be seen to be reliant on the wealth and power of transnational criminal organizations, global economic institutions can sometimes appear to “usurp” the role of the state, especially in matters concerning the future possibilities of said corporation.
 

The collision of the worlds of economics/commerce and public authority is the realm in which much of today’s questions regarding public and private authority come to rest.  Keeping global corporations accountable requires a recognized global authority.  Unfortunately, this authority is severely lacking (the case could be argued that it doesn’t truly exist at all).  As a result, corporations that find themselves operating in the top left corner of our two by two (impermeable boundaries and autonomy) alongside state actors will find themselves in violent conflict over who has authority, be it public or private, to implement regulations and determine success.  The general weakening of commercial boundaries as corporations seek more transnational commerce distinguishes a palpable absence of a single global public authority to regulate and resolve ambiguities between states and corporations.  The result is messy.  Unfortunately, because there is no current global authority to fulfill this role, the mess continues, sometimes working itself out and other times not so much.


I used to think of the state as actually being an economic actor buying and selling services.  Thanks to this week’s discussion and lecture, it is now clear to me that that is not the case.  The biggest argument in swaying me was the relationship of citizens and states vs customers and private transactions.  Long standing relationships between customers and corporations is not a contracted connection; I can shop at Walmart once and decide Target is infinitely better and never again return to make a purchase at Walmart.  On the other hand, as a citizen of a state, I have contracted to abide by rules and contribute to a greater purpose until such a time as I may transfer my citizenship.  I believe this to be key in considering the public vs private authority dilemma of globalized corporations.

Week 9 Post- Nuclear Arms and the Other

Week 9 Post-  Nuclear Arms and the “Other"

In my mind, the global community shares two immediate and self-inflicted threats that supersede all others.  Second only to our egregious contribution to, and failure to date to mitigate, climate change is our similar failure to close that Pandora’s box on nuclear armament.  I am glad we are discussing it in this class.  While understandable given time constraints, I am sorry we could not discuss it further.  That Kenneth Waltz believes, and even titles an article, “More May be Better” (1995) scares the daylights out of me. I am grateful for Gustersons’ attempt to grant us perspective in dialogue. And, I am wary of solutions such as Blair’s that phase in steps that could all too easily be circumvented by actors in whose hands weapons of mass destruction are most dangerous.  So, what is the answer? 

  

Anyone who claims “more may be better,” must live in a lovely bubble.  With reductions to date, we still have 15,000 or so too many.  This does not require academic analysis.  We have something that can go “boom” and set off a series of “booms” to an end no one wants to imagine.  Dr. Suess wrote about it for young children who understood.  Please forgive my condescending tone.  I am concerned, for all Waltz’s faith in (fairly-airmed?) humanity’s constraint,  that we have at least one psychopath half a world away building the means by which to wreak nuclear havoc, and another man running for the highest office in our own country who wants to know why, if we build them, we do not want to use them - and who seems all too eager to set off a global game of “chicken.”  We have felt this game coming on before in a saner world.  And, it was not fun then.   

My generation grew up in the shadow of the Cold War.  My son was a year old when, like 100 million others, several friends and I sat rapt in my living room watching “The Day After” (please forgive my channeling an episode of The Americans – it did call up the memory).  It was my musician crowd – each had written at least one set of lyrics on the subject in his or her lifetime, most several.  We only half-jokingly talked about pooling our money and buying an island together – or moving to the Catskills.  The wife of a bass player had a huge old family home there we sometimes used as a sort of retreat.  If we were all doomed to go up in some terrible cloud, why not together in the company of friends in a place we all loved?   In our world, the “Us” and the “Them” were states, not the people comprising those, two “stupid giants,” who were bound to annihilate us all through political posturing.  By the time “The Day After” aired, tests had been conducted by, in addition to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the U.K., France, China and India.  Israel was not on our radar. Nor was Pakistan. There was chatter about Iran, particularly through the hostage crisis –it was surreal, insane.  Nothing seemed out of the question, but the idea that they might present a nuclear threat seemed implausible.  As for North Korea, Kim Jong Un was still in his mother’s womb. 

We were in Germany the year the Berlin Wall came down. My son was seven. Celebrating the end of that Cold War fear tucked into nearly everyone’s consciousness, we thought maybe, maybe, our greatest threat now was simply in the clean-up.  It was no longer about offense and defense, but accidents.  For a moment, there was no “other,” just two players who now needed to fix the mess they had made. However, daunting the task may have appeared, it felt doable.   And, then it seemed the conversation shifted – those that did not have it wanted access to that power and the right to “deter."  

Gusterson asks us to recognize that we may not be wearing the white hats in this.  He presents arguments that are unpalatable to us from a power perspective and others we are more inclined to embrace.  It is hard to accept, but if we do not grant the rest of the world voice on a par with our own, if we cannot brace for the same judgment we direct at others, any effort to come to consensus on solution is doomed.  Granted, some are less so, but none, including us, are responsible enough to wield the power of the arsenals that exist today.  There is too much that can go awry. 

Blair lays out a plan for de-escalating risk by “de-alerting,” or extending the time necessary to employ a nuclear attack or response from minutes to days, weeks and months.  Ultimately, this would provide incentive to eliminate the weapons altogether.  The four-phase process makes sense – except in Blair’s admission that even at Phase 1, verifiability would be an issue. And, that is a big one.    

Jeffrey Lewis, in a recent FP article, suggests the answer can only lie in the elimination of plutonium.  No plutonium, no new weapons. Ideally, as a weapon is retired and dismantled, the stuff of it is properly disposed of.   In theory, this was to have happened all along.  Despite agreements between the United States and Russia in 2000, 2007 and 2010, disputes between the two countries have prevented the disposition of “tens of thousands of nuclear weapons’ worth” of plutonium.  Nevertheless, this is the only answer that makes sense.  Removing temptation, removing the key component, ultimately places everyone on an even playing field in the nuclear armament arena – those weapons still in play go away along with the means by which to build them anew. 

References

Blair, Bruce G.  2008. “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Increasing Warning and Decision Time.”  International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo February 26-27, 2008.  

Gusterson, Hugh. 2013. “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination.” Cultural Anthropology 14(1): 111-43. 

Lewis, Jeffrey.  2016. “The United States and Russia Are Preparing for Doomsday.”Foreign Policy Magazine.  October 7, 2016 issue.   http://foreignpolicy.com/author/jeffrey-lewis/ accessed November 3, 2016.