Since our Week 11 discussion, I have been mulling over the
question of whether the “public” can exist beyond the “state,” whether it is a
broader concept. The consensus of the
class appeared to be “no.” Andrew
presented an example in Venezuela. This was countered in a statement that the
public was still defined by the laws of the state; the public was not sovereign. We then looked inward at the shrinking of the
concept based on Erica’s point that certain groups in a given country might be
omitted from the services, rights and protections provided by the state. This, in
effect, renders those groups “quasi-publics.” And, finally, we looked at
privatization, discussing whether outsourcing certain functions of the state
might render the state, at some point, no longer viable, and a private entity
simply a replacement state. However, I
am not so sure there is not a fluid component to a public, something that perpetually resides outside the state,
and that is perhaps so taken for granted we do not consider it public. I would like to explore this a little through
(1) Kobrin’s concept of a de-territorialized mode of operation in the international
market, (2) social and public networking, and (3) the proliferation of
misinformation sources and appeals to base emotion molding a public bound not
by a sovereignty but by impulse.
I suggest up front, while sovereignty defines “state,” it does not define the public
on which it is dependent. Hobbes himself
spoke of the “State of Nature.” While I do not buy into his characterization of
it or the idea of absolute autonomy, any consideration of it precludes a
dependency on state for a public to exist. There are
human groups (albeit small) particularly in our pre-history, that effectively survived
in fluid modes of community with no clear authority. To some extent, that
flexibility was the survival strategy itself. We create our boxes – our definitions and
rules – in temporal context. But, to Kobrin’s point, something did exist before drawn and universally
recognized political boundaries and this is where I wish we had had time in class to
discuss the readings in greater depth. Kobrin’s
suggestion that the transition of economic politics to cyberspace alters the fundamental nature of economic governance along with his arguments related to
networked forms of organization speak precisely to that notion of a sovereign-free
public extending beyond a sovereign-bound state. He likens it to a medieval dynamic replete
with overlapping, meshed, competing, or separate but parallel political
authorities. Kobrin identifies network transaction webs as replacements for previous
economic hierarchies. Actors become, in essence, a public operating
simultaneously in disparate national economies and an unbound globalized network.
And, that can conceivably be
extrapolated out to include contexts that are not economic, but social or even
quasi-civic in nature
As illustrated by Kobrin, a public can adapt fairly readily
to fundamental contextual transformations.
Increasingly, this is true of social networks and NGOs operating
globally. This may not always translate to adaptation that is reasoned or in
the actor’s self-interest. But, for better or worse, it need not be bound to
geography or the state from which it has its roots. It can exist simultaneously
in two or more worlds and can ultimately affect the state or a collection of states from both within and without. Hearkening back to another class module, through communications connectivity, ideas and information now flow relatively freely, networks are formed and a new
set of shared values take place across geographical space. Loose, sometimes mercurial conglomerations
have power to alter state action, offer protection to its members, provide information,
and so on. This might be more tangibly seen the case of international NGOs, but
online social networks can mobilize toward goals as wide-ranging as petitioning
a global actor to change policy or bringing the cause of an individual to the fore. There are bone marrow transplant connections and crowd funding sites. They can influence language and
sentiment - and subsequently the way we think generally. The “public” in this sense
may be fluid and distinct from any governing entity, but it has needs that are
met by it virtual host and effect on both its own members and geographically
bound actors.
A concern lies in the normalization of interactions with
few, if any, established bounds so that recruitment to extremist group or fake
news sites swaying the results of elections, for instance, become socially
enabled mechanisms to ends couched in passion and impulse rather than ideas or
rational self-interest – terrorism or demagogic adoration. We asked in class
whether ISIS, as an example, might be considered a state. The argument that it was not lay in the
absence of universal recognition, based on, in its nascence, non-conformance to
fundamental values deemed acceptable by the global community. There is another consideration: ISIS is a global entity highly reliant on
virtual connection and hype. Is it
possible that we are looking at it from the wrong side of the lens, that it
constitutes a public as Kobrin imagines global economic actors, at once bound
to geographic communities and governance within those, but also residing in
unbound cyber-generated webs value-aligned to terror predilections?
Kirstin, great post! I really like the portion at the end where you address what ISIS may or may not be. I'll be honest, I lay in the 'its not a state' camp, but for more reasons than just the mutual recognition factor. The biggest alternative factor is that in addition to not having mutual recognition with other world powers, the vast majority of IS' subjects do not recognize its authority and consider themselves (and legally are) citizens of another nation. In my opinion, that makes them a failed state, or proto-state at best.
ReplyDeleteNevertheless, the discussion on Korbin's writings was great! I think it opens up an interesting avenue of analysis towards problems such as IS.