Week 12 Post: Silver Linings: McNamara, The EU, Brexit and Trump

Week 12 Post:  Silver Linings: McNamara, The EU, Brexit and Trump

This week’s class discussion related to the question of a global public sphere revolved primarily around NGOs.   But, I do want to go back to the first reading,” Constructing authority in the European Union” as the EU has been put to the test in the six years since the article was written.    I am sure I was not alone in overlaying thought akin to, “I wonder what McNamara is saying now” to every point she was making on cultural foundations and successes. The section “Abolishing borders, creating community” was especially difficult to get through without the perpetual what-ifs and if-onlys floating through my head.  It is hard to see a world that appeared to be coming together so torn.  I confess this is not the only reason I bring this reading into my Week 12 blog. As I sat a little forlorn and considering switching back to some NGO related theme, my phone flashed a headline from the Washington Post: “After Brexit and Trump’s victory, Europeans are beginning to like the E.U.again.”  It was a welcome break from the gloom. Drawing on points made in the article, I reflect here on the E.U., Brexit, and Trump in relation to an earlier shift in global dynamics that may grant us, if not reprieve in the moment, a reminder that all those ideas passing between us, all the shields we put up against the world, will not change our once unfathomable interconnectedness and the collective fortitude that comes out of it.

 Rick Noack notes in his November 23 article that both Brexit and Trump’s election launched “crisis meetings” in the EU, which coincided with approval ratings going up in five of the six most populous European countries. So, Britain is having a difficult time with that exit thing and our President-elect’s relationship with Putin is making our European friends look less critically on the union’s imperfections.  Were the vote taken today, Brexit would be a thing of the past tomorrow.  While nearly half of Denmark would have voted themselves out as well a few months ago, that number is down to ten percent.  Even Norbert Hofer, Austria’s Trump, has done an about turn on his demand for a referendum. At what seemed the eleventh hour, nations are rallying.

McNamara speaks to the subtle influences on the creation of European identity beyond economics – the construction of the European Union as a “social fact,” something taken as a given.  Passports, education, formal and informal shared resources, most obviously influence this.  But, the way people interact changes as well. While national identity remains, there ever more linking the individual states.  They are driven together by evolving intersubjective understandings. And so, for all the squabbling and turns at rejecting the whole, a realization is taking hold that they are truly, to borrow from a campaign slogan across the water, “stronger together.”

The same sentiment played out in Marrakesh this month.  There is an environmental connectedness after the Paris Accords that is strengthening in the face of threats from the incoming U.S. regime.  The world is not crumbling but rather marshaling forces in like communities that are increasingly overlapping, interweaving, and melding with others.  We can build walls and burn bridge to our leaders’ content. Thankfully, there is a shared “other,” or twenty or a hundred, out there with whom we each have connection in one way or another crafting new bridges with bricks from those very walls.   

McNamara notes, "...the postmodern cultural turn has been a critical legitimizing force enabling the EU's success at the same time as it creates unique stresses and strain's for this global governor" (173). In my mind at first reading, the stresses had tested its governor beyond capacity.  Maybe not.  

References: 

McNamara, Kathleen R. 2010. "Constructing authority in the European Union." in Who Governs the Globe:153-179   

Noack, Rick. 2016. "After Brexit and Trump's victory, Europeans are beginning to like the E.U. again." Washington Post <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/24/europeans-start-liking-the-e-u-again/#comments>  Accessed November 24, 2016

 

Week 12 Post-Class: The Global Commons

The Global Commons

The Infancy of a Global Civil Society

     This is a bit of a rehash of my (second) argument from our most recent class discussing the emergence of a global civil society. Before we begin, I'll put all cards on the table. I originally selected 'unicorn', basically suggesting that a global civil society (GCS) does not exist. I prefaced this on the notion that a global civil society would require a form of global social contract that does not presently exist (see: global governance vs global government). All of that being said, following some excellent insights from my classmates (namely, Kirstin) and looking up a more accurate definition of civil society (yea, that happened) I changed my mind. After sitting in class for the next several minutes thinking about the issue, I reached a conclusion that a global civil society was emerging.

     What defines civil society? Here's what the World Bank has to say...

"...organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations."

"Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations."

     ...(of note, there is nothing that requires a mechanism of civil society to 'bring people together' in an all encompassing moralistic sense - the sense in which we were arguing it in class - it simply must enable the expression of those interests and values and have an affect on public life. If it divides us, it's still [technically] civil society. The division is more our fault, than its.)

     What makes a civil society entity global versus national? The crossing borders part is critical, however the commitment must go further. It requires, in my opinion, that the entity and its membership place human issues above national politics. It is evident from a snapshot of the organizations we looked at in preparation for Week 13 (ah, the benefits of a post-class blog!) that a plethora of NGOs, charitable organizations and the like exist and cross borders. One of the most famous... MSF, otherwise known as Doctors Without Borders.

     Now, such examples are not alone. The 21st century has also democratized a growing, albeit controversial, example of civil society: the Internet. My fellow classmates made a variety of points about the virtual global commons, some supporting the Internet as example of global civil society, others suggesting that it is too limited. I would like to do two things: rebuke its limitations as a characteristic which disqualifies it as a contributor to a global civil society; additionally, I would like to define the Internet's role in global civil society.

     Rebuke: Quite simply - evolution. Many great points were made about the extent to which the Internet has been democratized to lower-income countries with weaker infrastructure and less wealth populations. None of these points disqualifies the reality that the Internet acts as an 'entity' (definition forthcoming) of civil society. In truth, the Internet is in its infancy as such a mechanism (read: 'entity'). Of course this birth will start in the most technologically and monetarily advanced nations. By comparison to where we were 10 or even 15 years ago, the Internet's reach and influence have expanded exponentially. I am certain that this reach and influence will continue to grow. While it may be imperfect now, it is both global (though not total) and growing. Sooner or later, individuals in the Congo, or the poorest parts of India will have access to the world's forum (hint) and with it, join in on global civil society. Does this mean their voices will all be heard? Does it even mean that their voices will overpower those in the West or in Asia? No, there are no guarantees, but nevertheless there will be global communities on the internet where their interests and values can be expressed. The absolutist and historically disconnected argument that because an 'entity' does not reach *everyone*, that it is invalidated, is flawed and contradicts any examples we have in reality.

     Finally, my attempt at defining the Internet's role. The Internet serves as a global forum for activity ranging from communication to trade. In the case of civil society, the Internet, as a global forum, serves as a platform to enable the creation of such entities across borders. Examples include social media, subject-specific forums and any website dedicated to a specific cause or set of interests and values. Thus, the Internet is an evolving (but active!) springboard for the creation of global civil society. In many ways, it has already established an strong presence in public life and its reach is only growing.

Week 11 Post-Class: A Self-Defeating System

A Self-Defeating System

The Anarchic International Realm Contributes to the Modern Erosion of State Sovereignty

     That was a longer sub-title than I had intended. Regardless, it makes the point I will try to elaborate on. We're living in an age with globalized actors. Not just local actors who happen to operate in a globalized world (read: stage), i.e. sovereign states, but truly international actors whose power-bases and reach cross boundaries and span the world.

     One example is the multi-national corporation. The rise of global corporations began in the early modern period as mercantilism empires spread across the world and enabled the growth of the state corporations such as the British East and West India companies. These types of corporations were not the same entities we see today, however, as they were ultimately dominated by nation-states. In the modern day, at least in the West, private enterprises have arisen with levels of influence and wealth rivaling many modern states. Corporations such as Apple, Shell and Deutsche Bank, while headquartered in one particular location, operate trans-nationally and can be re-headquartered fluidly.

     Trans-national operation and fluidity are the critical elements here. A corporation, headquartered in one nation, can open up shop in another in order to circumvent the laws of its chartered state, for example McDonald's and the United States. While on an individual level, for singular citizens (in this case human beings, not corporate entities) this may work as the impact of any one person is relatively limited and so too is their ability to escape justice (again, by and large - the very rich, and thus capable, have the ability to operate in similar ways to corporations). When you transpose that same trans-national fluidity onto a corporate entity with far greater resources and far less tangible person-hood, matters are more complicated.

     Taxation is an excellent example here. Traditionally, a person (both in human and corporate form) is taxed by their state of residence and any other territory they visit or otherwise do business in. Corporate, or otherwise extraordinarily rich, entities have a higher degree of fluidity. By using such tactics as establishing regional headquarters in a tax haven, such as Apple in Ireland, these entities are able to avoid a significant portion of their tax burden to their original charter-state. This is in a sense, a degradation of charter-state sovereignty as many are able to escape the bounds of sovereign law for more favorable shores while still gaining many of the benefits of residence in the charter-state. Again, this example is not specific to corporations, they just highlight a particularly striking point.

     Due to the fact that there are not international norms or 'laws' that govern such practices, anarchy exists. In order to limit this practical erosion of sovereignty, anarchy must be hedged. This sounds country intuitive as anarchy theoretically enables the complete sovereignty of a nation-state, but in reality a 'reduction' of anarchy could have a similar effect. I don't have a full solution for this problem, as it would likely take much more than a blog post, but a place to start is the creation of international norms (and potentially a legally binding agreement at the WTO) to punish tax havens and the entities that utilize them to escape their obligations to their charter-states.

Week 12 Post Class

This week’s discussion on the global public society centered primarily on the question of whether this society exists, and if so, to what extent.  Prior to the readings and online lecture, I was of the mind that a global public sphere did indeed exist, and that it was well on it’s way to thriving.  This belief was based loosely on the level of Internet access and proliferation of transnational NGOs throughout the world.  In hindsight, I would modify my response to say that the global sphere is emerging (slowly), and for the same reasons, but is not yet fully functioning. 

The points brought up by both Dan and Kyra stood out as imperative to delving deeper into the question.  Particularly, is a social contract required of a global society?  If so, then this global society is still in its “unicorn” state, as no such contract has been enacted.  In class, I believe an excellent case was made that a social contract is not a requirement for a global society, essentially because an agreement between states does not equate to a social contract; it becomes more of global governance at that point. 

Many examples of an emerging global sphere include Internet sensations such as the ALS bucket challenge, the Arab Spring, and even the mannequin challenge.  While Internet is a powerful tool for reaching out and improving the world we live in, it often has the power to divide the world as well.  I really liked Erica’s point about the African countries with the easiest access to Internet; these countries possess largely tourist-centered economies.  Considering this, one can see that most of the Internet usage in these countries is not utilized by the local population, which means that the Internet is not as widely spread/accessible as we may think.

Developing a true global public society is a complex and sometimes seemingly impossible feat.  Taking the societies of the world and all of their differences and bringing them into a singular sphere will take years to accomplish at the rate we are currently moving.  Katherine mentioned the “Big Bang” of political authority and that because we are in the middle of this big bang, we cannot see the total fruition of the global society, nor will we until we are significantly past its forming.   My favorite point from class this week came from Kyra when she mentioned that until being human is placed above politics we will never be where we need to be to form this global society as an important part of international relations.

Week 11 Post: The Public, Cyberspace and Kobrin

Since our Week 11 discussion, I have been mulling over the question of whether the “public” can exist beyond the “state,” whether it is a broader concept.  The consensus of the class appeared to be “no.”  Andrew presented an example in Venezuela. This was countered in a statement that the public was still defined by the laws of the state; the public was not sovereign.  We then looked inward at the shrinking of the concept based on Erica’s point that certain groups in a given country might be omitted from the services, rights and protections provided by the state. This, in effect, renders those groups “quasi-publics.” And, finally, we looked at privatization, discussing whether outsourcing certain functions of the state might render the state, at some point, no longer viable, and a private entity simply a replacement state.  However, I am not so sure there is not a fluid component to a public, something that perpetually resides outside the state, and that is perhaps so taken for granted we do not consider it public.  I would like to explore this a little through (1) Kobrin’s concept of a de-territorialized mode of operation in the international market, (2) social and public networking, and (3) the proliferation of misinformation sources and appeals to base emotion molding a public bound not by a sovereignty but by impulse. 

I suggest up front, while sovereignty defines “state,” it does not define the public on which it is dependent.  Hobbes himself spoke of the “State of Nature.” While I do not buy into his characterization of it or the idea of absolute autonomy, any consideration of it precludes a dependency on state for a public to exist.  There are human groups (albeit small) particularly in our pre-history, that effectively survived in fluid modes of community with no clear authority. To some extent, that flexibility was the survival strategy itself.  We create our boxes – our definitions and rules –  in temporal context.  But, to Kobrin’s point, something did exist before drawn and universally recognized political boundaries and this is where I wish we had had time in class to discuss the readings in greater depth.  Kobrin’s suggestion that the transition of economic politics to cyberspace alters the fundamental nature of economic governance along with his arguments related to networked forms of organization speak precisely to that notion of a sovereign-free public extending beyond a sovereign-bound state.  He likens it to a medieval dynamic replete with overlapping, meshed, competing, or separate but parallel political authorities. Kobrin identifies network transaction webs as replacements for previous economic hierarchies. Actors become, in essence, a public operating simultaneously in disparate national economies and an unbound globalized network.  And, that can conceivably be extrapolated out to include contexts that are not economic, but social or even quasi-civic in nature

As illustrated by Kobrin, a public can adapt fairly readily to fundamental contextual transformations.  Increasingly, this is true of social networks and NGOs operating globally. This may not always translate to adaptation that is reasoned or in the actor’s self-interest. But, for better or worse, it need not be bound to geography or the state from which it has its roots. It can exist simultaneously in two or more worlds and can ultimately affect the state or a collection of states from both within and without.  Hearkening back to another class module, through communications connectivity, ideas and information now flow relatively freely, networks are formed and a new set of shared values take place across geographical space.  Loose, sometimes mercurial conglomerations have power to alter state action, offer protection to its members, provide information, and so on. This might be more tangibly seen the case of international NGOs, but online social networks can mobilize toward goals as wide-ranging as petitioning a global actor to change policy or bringing the cause of an individual to the fore. There are bone marrow transplant connections and crowd funding sites.  They can influence language and sentiment - and subsequently the way we think generally.  The “public” in this sense may be fluid and distinct from any governing entity, but it has needs that are met by it virtual host and effect on both its own members and geographically bound actors.

A concern lies in the normalization of interactions with few, if any, established bounds so that recruitment to extremist group or fake news sites swaying the results of elections, for instance, become socially enabled mechanisms to ends couched in passion and impulse rather than ideas or rational self-interest – terrorism or demagogic adoration. We asked in class whether ISIS, as an example, might be considered a state.  The argument that it was not lay in the absence of universal recognition, based on, in its nascence, non-conformance to fundamental values deemed acceptable by the global community.  There is another consideration: ISIS is a global entity highly reliant on virtual connection and hype.  Is it possible that we are looking at it from the wrong side of the lens, that it constitutes a public as Kobrin imagines global economic actors, at once bound to geographic communities and governance within those, but also residing in unbound cyber-generated webs value-aligned to terror predilections?