Week 8 Post Class Blog

Public Authority and the Control of Violence

In class this week, we delved into the question of whether or not private security undermines public authority.  The Abramson and Williams paper argues that it does not.  My personal experience with private security in the military persuades me otherwise.  The key piece of information that runs throughout the Abramson paper is that the explosive growth and use of privates security companies (PSCs) has become a crucial and often helpful method of states protecting their assets and citizens; their examples of Sierra Leone and Nigeria are powerful, but raise more questions that answers with me.  While I see certain promise in the development of their ideas and increased research, I’m still a little biased.

As a member of the military, I find it oddly disturbing to see someone guarding my installation that is not wearing the same uniform as me.  Granted, they are well trained and their presence allows more service members the opportunity to focus on their unit’s mission.  But still, I can’t help but play out disastrous scenarios in my mind.  It’s my base, why is someone from a different team protecting it?  Yes, there are many reasons for the decision to utilize PSCs as guards at military installations, and I don’t know what all they are, but that doesn’t make me feel any better.

Abramson and Williams claim that the state is beginning to interweave PSCs into their systems of power and authority as an augmentation to the already existing public police forces, sometimes out of lack of resources and sometimes to alter the structure of bureaucracy by moving from a “rowing” stance to a “steering” stance.  Their example of the “crises of penal modernism” highlights the importance of PSCs when the demand for protection and enforcement commodities increased exponentially faster than the public sector could supply new workers.  While I see the significance of this, I am still not sure that PSCs working with sovereign states alleviates doubts pertaining to loyalties and execution of duties.

I get it.  There are plenty of nations across the globe that just simply lack the resources, namely capital, to provide their own public security, even if they wanted to.  Sierra Leone and Nigeria, as explained by Abramson, falls into such a category.  PSCs provide options.  And while they may help “enhance the state’s economic and security capacities, this does not mean that they strengthen the state in a broader sense” (Abramson, 15).

I think in order for PSCs to be seen as a non-threat to sovereign states and their claim to public authority and legitimate violence, PSCs will have to be fully integrated as a full-fledged government agency, eliminating the pervading concern that they answer to more than one “master”.  Unfortunately, this will probably never happen; PSCs make entirely too much money to throw it all away and become another bureaucratic office.  So how do we change the perception that private security undermines public authority?  First, PSCs must hold themselves accountable for every task they undertake and make a pledge to honor boundaries put in place by the state.  Second, we as members of the state must make ourselves more knowledgeable and open to the possibility that PSCs are not just mercenaries, but contributing members to the security of all members of the state.

Week 8: A Clarifying Point...

A Clarifying Point...

Making the case against private military companies

The essence of this post is to offer some clarification on the point I was attempting to make this week in class regarding the use of private military companies by states for the application of force. I intend for this to be a short post overall, but I think the significance of this debate is certainly worth exploring further.

The choice to use private military companies can be made by states for a wide range of reasons ranging from as relatively noble as an attempt to conserve resources, but still provide similar functions (defenses) for its regular forces in the field, to less scrupulous activities like circumventing laws and ensuring personal loyalty to the client. There are two particular factors that are important to look at when examining the impact of PMCs: legal accountability and the monopoly on power.

Although the West is not immune, many other states, arguably most, suffer from high deficits of resources, political integrity or both. In such nations where the rule of law is strained by the forces of official corruption and/or economic deprivation, the monopoly on power is much more tenuous. While utilizing a PMC in lieu of regular forces, which may be too weak or otherwise preoccupied, may seem like a bright idea at the onset, it ultimately serves only to weaken the power of the state. This is so because, when used domestically (as is the case with most countries) the out-sourcing of enforcement demonstrates to the people that the government itself does not maintain a sufficient monopoly on power. Moreover, it weakens norms of national identity and pride that are created by maintain a uniformed, national force that is, at the very least, nominally loyal to the sovereign (be that a person, the people or a constitution) versus the client-of-the-day. Those loyalty issues may also exist in official forces, certainly in cash-strapped ones, but the idea that the government is the only official enforcement body of the law is equally as important as the enforcement itself. The idea is that troops, or security contractors (read: mercenaries), may enforce a monopoly on power, but only positive societal norms encourage a population to believe in it.

With regards to legal accountability, the lines can get quite blurry. The way I see it is that armed conflict (unlike office-based contractors that support other government services) requires strict control of all parties involved in order to maintain the relative (again, relative) rule of the law of armed conflict. In national armies this is maintained by the authority of commanders whom are empowered by national, military and international laws. This allows for the relative maintenance of good order and discipline, as well as compliance with the law. The blurring of those lines by foggy chains of accountability and command that inherently come with the territory of employing mercenaries or private security contractors not only weakens the enforcement of such laws by preventing corrective action, but also weakens the laws for all parties by allowing that lag in enforcement in the first place. The more a law is violated without correction, or the more immune certain parties appear, the weaker the law gets and as a cyclical consequence, the more it is violated. The blurring of legal accountability serves to weaken the authority of the commander, the rule of the laws of war and ultimately opens up opportunities for violation, most likely by parties with murky loyalties or accountability.

In these ways, private security contractors are significantly differentiated from non-combat oriented contractors working for the government. The latter provides crucial services that enhance government support for the population, whereas the former may also do so, but in most countries and in too many cases, such organizations only serve to weaken the rule of law. While in the most ideal of circumstances, some private military companies may do good work, because many others do not, it remains crucial to establish and maintain international norms against such behaviors.

Lastly, an important note in the interests of personal safety: mercenaries tend to not be protected by international humanitarian law in the same ways that national armies are. This opens up room for even the most well-intentioned private security organizations to put their people at extreme risk if they are ever captured performing even relatively benign logistical or defensive work. While this risk may seem lesser than that of death, it is not something to take lightly.

Reflections: Week 6/Module 3 Activity

Like Dan, I was lucky enough to get assigned into a group for our debate assignment whose position I already agreed with . . mostly.  I should probably begin by saying here that I'm a big fan of Star Trek (all series, though TNG and DS9 are best, clearly) and the idea that the international system could break from its current modus operandi and shift toward more rational, cooperative means overall, eventually leading toward a one-world government that is able to meet the needs of all its citizens without conflict, is something that definitely appeals to me, but it still seems to just be science fiction to me.  

I do believe that the international system could, theoretically, be changed, though I'm at a complete loss as to where exactly that change would come from or what would kickstart it, which I guess makes me a (reluctant) realist?  While the advent of international organizations and economic unions would at first seem to be a victory over coercion and the "old school" of the international order, we saw in our presentations/groupwork for that week that, for the most part, these organizations aren't fully effective in their goals and can even serve (in the case of the UNSC) as a tool for certain actors to block international attempts at checking their expressions of sovereignty/power.  Here, Dan has laid out most of my argument for me pretty succinctly already so I won't drone on too long - these organizations don't hold sovereignty above the nations that compose them and participation is on a voluntary basis, with each member state retaining the capability to take its ball to go home.  Likewise, as many of these nations are composed of unequal powers (the UNSC being the  chief example here), those states with the most power within the institution are more or less able to serve as de-facto "leaders" and organize the other members' policies around themselves.  In this way, they don't serve as checks to actors' expression of sovereignty so much as microphones.  

I'm not even certain that an existential threat to humanity would be sufficient to break us from our current perceptions of "us" and "them" (Pink Floyd, anyone?).  In the case of the Paris Climate Agreement, and earlier agreements, it seems that we don't tend to treat these kinds of threats with binding resolutions, or with anything more than flexible goals - if our world order can't even organize to save itself under the assumption that other states will be making similar economic sacrifices in order to stave of climate change (instead preferring to assume that no one will be making these sacrifices), how likely is it that we come together for any other reason?  I don't think we need greyskins to invade the planet to see that it may not be easily likely for the international system to come together.  Trey Parker & Matt Stone covered this one fairly well in an episode of South Park, I think - in the episode "Pinewood Derby," the nations of Earth aren't able to come together and keep their discovery of "space cash" a secret from intergalactic cops investigating a crime - of course, there's always going to be a rogue state that builds too many water parks and spoils it for everyone.  Perhaps this is a bit overly cynical here, but I wouldn't put it past some world leaders to spin invasion by little green men into a positive for his nation and its interests.  

Who Won? Reflections on Module 3 Class Debate

Reflections on Module 3 Class Debate

While team coordination was a challenge, the exercise in taking a position on whether the international environment can be fundamentally remade was worthwhile.  I enjoyed, to some extent, playing off one another as a team in composing arguments and felt the activity as a whole lent some clarity to all we had discussed to date.   That said, it was very difficult for many to join in when they would have liked due to other obligations and work constraints.  Like some others who have noted similar sentiment in their blogs, I am concerned the schedule for composing team positions and rebuttals assumes all or most, across time zones and with varying work and travel schedules, are available to contribute equally on very specific dates.  It may have played out more effectively over a loose timeline and perhaps as an in-character discussion rather than a team debate with formal openers and rebuttals.   The assignment of pros and cons would be the one component I would keep in place, adding a requirement for all to contribute at least twice to the discussion over the course of the week.  Those with other obligations (work, family, etc.) might, in this way, have had more opportunity to significantly contribute with the flexibility to write over the course of six days rather than two. 

Regarding who won, though I was on the “pro” side and do stand by that position, I felt the “con” team did an excellent job articulating their argument.  In that sense, I feel they won the debate.  They gained ground in noting the quadrupling of sovereign states in less than a century and reiterating Waltz’s argument that historically, we tend to circle back to the familiar.  The team, from my perspective, lost some ground in its dismissal of “common ground” platforms as fundamental transformations. They make a statement regarding new institutions as solely rational, interest-based mechanisms to retool negotiations, cooperation and compromise more efficiently That may be the case to a certain degree, but they fail to acknowledge that this kinder, gentler approach, in itself, is historically new, and a step toward the next incremental change.  Fundamental change would not occur suddenly and I found it interesting that one argument made from the “con” team - that change would be an evolution not a revolution – was the same one made by the “pro” team in our opening statement: “Our world is evolving…this is not an abrupt shift, but rather growth or adaptation to contextual stimuli….”  And, toward the end of the opener, another statement that incremental change does not mean a “new order” that emerges from that evolution is not fundamentally different from the thing that came at the start.   We cannot compare the time period between the inception of rational organizations such as the U.N. and the WTO – no more than a few decades - to the centuries between Hobbes and those organizations.  It would be like comparing the span the time between the advent of agriculture and the city-state organization of Ancient Greece to a Greece-Rome comparison.   We see fundamental change in the longer term.  Territoriality, for instance, would seem more “fundamental” or “inherent” from the fixed cultural perspective of an agricultural society – or one founded in that tradition – than from a nomadic perspective.

The pro team made some good points.  Those related to cooperation, from the Paris Agreement to human rights activity were especially strong.  Where I feel we dropped the ball was in developing and refining many of our points more cohesively as a team.   For the debate as a whole, there may have been some opportunity, in looking at each argument, to clarify concepts (it seems many have brought this up) and to refine what was presented.  Again, though, even without the in-character class experience, I think we all gained some perspective from the activity.

Week 6 (Post-Class): Context Theory

'Context Theory'

An argument against a change in the international realm

Fair warning: this turned out to be significantly longer than I expected! Maybe I should have just posted my mid-semester essay instead. In any case, enjoy! (and tell me what you think of course!)

I'll be honest, I've sat on this post for some time because I'm not entirely sure what to talk about following various posts and a short essay on essentially the same (read: a similar) subject. I feel like it would not have been appropriate to branch off into a separate discussion- the argument about change in the international realm has been the central topic of our course for the last few weeks. All of this having been said, I got a benefit that some of my classmates did not. In our in class assigned discussions, I was fortunately tasked with arguing for a side that I happened to agree with (for the most part).

Writing about this topic several times has enabled me to refine my argument. The purpose of this entry is to share the argument I made in my recent mid-semester essay. To this end, my argument focuses on the notion that the international realm is based on the fundamentals of human behavior. Culture and identity are an incredibly important part of the human experience, and it has been since we first achieved sentience- and likely, before.

In international relations, the notion of the nation remains central to the stability of the state. A nation-state without a nation is only held together by coercion. That is not stable. However, that is not to imply that national identity has any sort of permanence either, instead the difference between national identity and coercion is willful co-identification versus mandatory conformity. Such identity, based on a perception of common culture, is central to forming a nation. Further, much as we are taught in American University's Intercultural Communications course, culture and identity revolve around contrast. Specifically, it is the notion that you cannot understand (and thus fully comprehend) your own culture and identity without stepping into and experiencing another. As the old saying goes, light does not exist without dark. One culture and identity cannot exist without a foreign one to contrast it against. Otherwise, that original identity would be without purpose.

I propose that what we are witnessing in the international realm is not in fact a change in the fundamental operating principles of anarchy, but instead the rise of new nations based on the changing context of the 21st century and with it, a shift in international boundaries. The case-in-point here is the European Union. A growing European nation is evolving from the smaller nations of Europe much in the same way that a fledgling American nation evolved from the separate American nations of the original Thirteen Colonies. Admittedly, the convergence of European nations may be more drastic. Nevertheless, a new nation is emerging in the context of the 21st century as Europe must come together to compete with larger states ranging from America in the west to Russia, India and China to the east. Ultimately, as this evolution takes place - presuming it is not derailed by the compound crises of the early 21st century - European international borders will shift to the periphery of the bloc. In the end, however, the space that exists between those new boundaries and nations that lay beyond them is still anarchy.

Such anarchy is reinforced by the fact that while international organizations exist to regulate the relationship between nations, they do not supersede the sovereign authority of the nations which subscribe to them. The survival of sovereign authority is evidenced by the fact nations enter into such organizations and agreements willingly. They subscribe to constraints willingly. Sovereignty is not ceded; codes of reasonable behavior, that are in the relative self-interest of all partied states, are agreed upon. All nations, however, remain capable of seceding from such organizations and agreements.

To this end, the UN Security Council remains an oddity that may, at first glance, contravene this argument. In writing at least, it has the authority to intervene when it sees threats to international peace and security. This may erode the notion of sovereign authority. In practice, such intervention only occurs when the sovereign states that comprise the UNSC agree that a certain course of action is agreeable. Because the UNSC is not in and of itself sovereign, it is only comprised of sovereign states that agree to joint decisions. There has not been a true cessation of sovereignty in the way that the states that comprise the United States have ceded sovereignty to the federal government, or in the way that European states have ceded sovereignty to the EU (their aspiring federal government). Instead, the UNSC can only impose its decisions by force - martial, economic, or otherwise - not be legal action backed by the understanding that it is sovereign over a state. We see this occur in practice as states who end up on the wrong end of a UNSC resolution rarely bow to it willingly in the way American states or European countries do.

To conclude then, I restate that what we are witnessing is the evolution of new nations and the shifting of boundaries, based on the changing context of the 21st century, but not fundamental change away from the inherent anarchy that exists between sovereign human groups.

Week 6 (post class)

Is Fundamental Change Possible?

Over the past week, our class has been divided into warring factions: those who argued that the international system CAN be changed, and those who argued that it CAN’T.  I fell into this latter category, and am so thankful to be able to “break character” today because I am a firm believer in change.  While I think my team did a marvelous job in laying out a con argument for purpose of the learning exercise, I found my self wrestling my own mind to consider that fundamental changes just don’t happen, that we have been the same international system since the Greeks.  While we are obviously not living like the Greeks today, the argument is that the states of anarchy and power are relatively the same and will continue to be as they have always been. 

This belief truly saddens me.  If there is no room for fundamental change, why bother with politics, international relations, government, war, etc…?  What’s the point?  Just the idea of change provides hope and encouragement for those who see today’s international system as broken but mendable, whether or not that change provides positive or negative outcomes is, objectively, irrelevant; if change is possible that means a different world is possible.  I believe in the ability to change the international system on a fundamental basis; it may take years, more than a single generation even, but I truly believe it is possible.

I really like one of the comments in the opening statement from the pro side: “When the number of powers increases, Waltz suggests that states shift away from advancing their own interests and toward seeking a common denominator.”  This shift towards common denominators is highly relevant in today’s world as the group succinctly exemplifies in their statement.  Even the inclusion of non-state actors doesn’t hamper this development, but instead provides more stabilization.

We argued for the con that fundamental change is not possible because two of the fundamental elements of the international system cannot change: actors and interests.  Rather, only the calculations and methods to obtain interests changes. What a gloomy life.  While I do not doubt that actors often manipulate and restructure institutions to reach their desired end state/interests, I do not agree that it is the only occurring action of “change”.  In class, Professor Shirk once mentioned that this fundamental change might not come until something as external as an alien invasion takes place, when a common enemy creates a new division of the proverbial “us” and “them”.  While our con argument did bring this up, I think it was used for the wrong argument.

As Dan is always so quick to point out, the middle ground is also an option in the theories we discuss in this class: some change is fundamental, some is “disguised” as cosmetic restructuring of institutions.  And that’s where I think I am, in the middle, although certainly leaning more towards the possibility of fundamental change.